



Daily Report

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LAST ISSUE

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-160
Friday
16 August 1996

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East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-160

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Albania: PS Not To Participate in Electoral Commission

AU1508134496 Tirana ATA in English
1251 GMT 15 Aug 96

[Report by A. Frasheri]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 15 (ATA)—The Socialist Party [PS] refuses to take part in the permanent electoral commission.

This was announced after the President of the Republic Sali Berisha decreed the commission. The PS rejects the composition of the commission and the ratio this commission is built on.

"The setting up of this commission itself, its decree by the president, seems at first sight as if it establishes correct ratios between the government coalition and the opposition. In fact these ratios are fictive," the PS Deputy Chairman Servet Pellumbi says.

The President of the Republic decreed on August 13 the composition of the Central Electoral Commission, in which four out of the seven seats of the opposition belong to the PS.

Regarding the composition of the commission, the president also held a meeting with the parties participating in the local government, a meeting which was boycotted by the opposition.

The creation of the Permanent Electoral Commission is one of the CE [Council of Europe] recommendations.

"We have asked that the party round table be effective, without prejudice," Pellumbi says. Meanwhile the PS has declared that it will not take part in the round table called by the Democratic Party [PD] on August 16.

The PS, seeing the ratios and composition of the commission, refuses to take part because according to Pellumbi "The Commission Presidency has been appointed by the government."

He says that the "Commission should have a party composition, but the chairman should be appointed by the commission itself and he should have no right to vote."

Based on the Law on Elections, it is the government which prepares the conditions for holding the elections and which is responsible for their fair development.

"If the PS claims that the four points have not been met, one cannot think that all the opposition demands will be accepted, because then, we should accept that the ruling party, parliament and government, the whole political spectrum, will act under the dictate of the

opposition," the PD Deputy Chairman Ali Spahija said in an interview with ATA on Wednesday [14 August].

Meanwhile, the Albanian state authorities have assured that the local government elections will be completely free and fair.

Albania: AD Doubts 'Legitimacy' of New Electoral Commission

AU1508133596 Tirana ATA in English
1247 GMT 15 Aug 96

[Report by A. Frasheri]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 14 (ATA)—The Democratic Alliance Party [AD] which boycotted the May 26 elections, issued a statement Wednesday [14 August] where it said it is against the president's decree on the creation of the permanent Central Election Commission [KQZ], doubting its legitimacy.

"The president has violated the law by decreeing the KQZ," the AD Secretary Arben Imami said.

It is, according to the Main Constitutional Provisions, the right of the President of the Republic to decree the creation of the KQZ. "The KQZ creation is closing doors to the participation of the opposition in the upcoming local elections," said the AD President Neritan Ceka.

The AD has declared its boycott for the local elections right at the moment the President of the Republic held the first meeting with the Albanian political parties on July 18. The AD did not participate in the first local elections in 1992.

The round table of political parties decided the KQZ's composition will be based on the ratio of the results the political parties had in the first local elections.

Albania: AD Rejects Invitation To Discuss Local Elections

AU1508125696 Tirana POLI I QENDRES
in Albanian 15 Aug 96 p 3

[Article by A. Kola: "We Must First Dismantle the Dictatorship, Then We Can Talk About Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The game playing with discussion tables about the local elections is continuing. An invitation from the Democratic Party [PD] signed by Gjongecaj has arrived at Democratic Alliance [AD] headquarters, showing the PD is ready to "put its house in order" with what it calls the "phantom" parties, too. Gjongecaj has informed 19 small parties, among which he surprisingly includes the AD and the Democratic Party of the Right, that the Electoral Law will be discussed on the very day on which the law demands the

election date and the commissions must finally be appointed. Any discussion is now fruitless because neither the date of the elections, the composition of the Permanent Central Electoral Commission, nor the recommendations of the resolution of the Council of Europe were ever discussed with the opposition parties. The PD is now using this discussion table as "democratic window dressing" to make it possible to repeat the farce of 26 May at the local elections. It is not possible to guarantee that the free vote of the people will not be outraged at the local elections, with a commission in which decisions are made by a majority vote and the balance is 11 to six in favor of the government. Within the 17-member commission, the six opposition members will not be able to prevent flagrant vote-rigging and violations of the law. The only thing they will be able to do is to repeat their tactic of 26 May with a boycott. The opposition is now cautious in its behavior, trying to avert a repeat of what happened four months ago.

Asked about Gjongecaj's invitation, AD President Neritan Ceka said the PD is trying to create the idea that "talks were also held with the other parties that did not participate in the local government elections." Overlooking the question of how far Gjongecaj is in a position to discuss Albania's political problems, this invitation comes at a time when in fact everything is over and the PD has decided to repeat what it did in the parliamentary elections. Ceka went on to say that, under such circumstances, unless a roundtable of parties is organized according to the recommendations of the Council of Europe, there can be no question of sitting down and talking to the PD. The first duty of political forces in Albania is to dismantle the dictatorship, and then we can talk about the elections, but only in the presence of a third party. The Council of Europe must organize the promised roundtable in order to establish genuine dialogue between the government and the opposition.

The AD has, in the meantime, responded positively to the invitation of the International Republican Institute to participate in a seminar to be organized by the institute's specialists. Ceka has called this seminar a useful form of specialized discussion, and elections will be discussed theoretically without political conditions. However, theoretical expertise and recommendations will bear little relation to what the PD will do in practice.

Albania: Article Predicts PD Will 'Rig' 20 Oct Elections

AU1508132096 Tirana ZERI / POPULLIT
in Albanian 15 Aug 96 p 6

[Article by Bashkim Koci: "Berisha's Order: 'Quick March'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] President Berisha has finally decreed the appointment of the Central Electoral Commission. The chairman, his deputy, the secretary, and a list of members representing the parties on the government side have been announced. As is well known, the opposition is not participating because electors would feel betrayed and the country would be plunged into another electoral farce.

Thus, the first step has been taken for the Democratic Party [PD] to rig the local elections on 20 October, just as it rigged the 26 May elections. It appears that Berisha will not be deterred from his efforts to maintain an illegitimate hold on power, but will stave off the opposition by usurping the commissions and even using violence. Berisha has ignored—or, to be more exact—nodded in appreciation of the Socialist Party's [PS] participation in the roundtable with the PD, at which the PS put forward eight conditions guaranteeing free, fair, and democratic elections. In this way, he has insulted the largest opposition party and the electorate it represents. Mr. Berisha has thus offered a fait accompli, and has issued a "quick march" order for the rigging of the local elections. As is well known, he alone issues orders.

The declarations by the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and the U.S. State Department about the irregularities and a rerun of the 26 May elections have thus been given another snub. The conditions the PS offered to the PD have also been snubbed. The decree on the appointment of the Central Electoral Commission means that nothing will be done toward revising the Law on the Organization and Functions of Local Government, that no law to prevent rigging will be forthcoming, the Genocide Law and the Law on Screening Official Figures will not be repealed, and so forth. According to Berisha and the PD, the local elections will have the same "democratic features" as those of 26 May. The electoral commissions, both centrally and locally, will be in the PD's hands. Intelligence Service agents [shikas] and policemen will take over the polling stations. The Radio-Television will be in the hands of the PD, which will also possess unlimited funds. We will be left to watch part two of the drama "The Theft of the Votes."

Logic suggests that Berisha and the PD are incorrigible. They are prepared to sacrifice anything and even to

isolate the country once again just to cling to power. The moral depths to which the PD has sunk is shown by the fact that it recognizes the legitimacy of the parliament, perhaps one of the only parliaments in the world to bear the mark of shame of having stolen the votes of the people, and has never shown any sign of regret over what happened on 26 May. The PD has no intention of carrying out free and fair elections. If one looks at the official propaganda, it is clear that it is concentrating all its artillery on keeping alive the illegitimate parliament and the equally illegitimate government that emerged from it. Meanwhile, it is also increasingly subject to despair.

Berisha is playing the now worn-out card of offering faits accomplis. He takes one step, and, seeing that the coast is clear, takes another. The decree appointing the Central Electoral Commission is one of the most visible and brazen signs that Berisha is planning to rig the elections on a scale equal to that of 26 May. Berisha sees nothing wrong in appointing as head of the commission an intellectual who will be remembered for his extreme efforts to pass off the parliamentary elections as free and honest. Can there be any more stubborn way of showing the entire public that "I am the same as I always was?" It is not hard to see that Berisha is trying to kill two birds with one stone. The elections of 26 May will be passed off as free and fair, and so will the next ones on 20 October.

The PS and the opposition have laid down conditions. If they are not fulfilled, the PD will be left to compete in the local elections only against the "Laco-parties" [reference to Teodor Laco's Social-Democratic Union, formed out of the section of the Social-Democratic Party that refused to leave the coalition with the PD. The opposition has derided this party as having been "created in Prime Minister Meksi's office"]. The decree appointing the Central Electoral Commission is Berisha's order for a "quick march" toward a repeat of the parliamentary elections of 26 May at local level on 20 October. At least, those are the marching orders so far. Therefore, the country's political crisis remains unsolved.

Albania: Cabinet Dismisses Articles as 'Groundless Slander'

AU1508131896 Tirana ATA in English
1248 GMT 15 Aug 96

["Statement of Spokesman of Council of Ministers"—ATA headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 14 (ATA)—Spokesman of the Council of Ministers said that the articles of August 11 and 14, 1996 in the dailies

KOHA JONE and POLI I QENDRES under the title "Lenny Fischer [President of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly] is bought with copper" are nothing but mean groundless slander.

Both articles said that the "Albanian Government has offered Fischer concessions for the copper's mines."

The Albanian Government and its institutions have made no talks or agreement for concessions in the copper industry. The only contract since today, the spokesman adds, is one that the copper industry has with the German Government for a study in this field with German Government granted funds for the Munella mining area. The study is the result of an agreement of 1989 which was carried out during 1994-1995 and continues today.

After saying that the Cooper Corporate has now only a joint venture with two Italian firms which has not yet started working, the spokesman clarifies that no other treaty has been realised.

"These mean slanders against foreign personalities, friends of the democratic Albania, are groundless, ill willed and show the political and civil irresponsibility of some pseudo politicians."

Albania: Berisha-U.S., Kosovar-Serb Relations Viewed

AU1408112696 Zurich BOTA SOT in Albanian
2 Aug 96 p 14

[Commentary by H. Matoshi: "Pragmatic Berisha Puts an End to 'Rhapsody at the Sheraton'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The opening of the U.S. Information Office [USIS] in Prishtina [Pristina] by Assistant Secretary of State Kornblum and later its inauguration by Congressman Engel occurred at a time when Albanian optimism was on the decline. So, President of the Republic of Kosovo Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, the Democratic League of Kosovo [LDK], and the Kosova Information Center took advantage of this event to claim credit for a fair Albanian policy. As soon as "the Rhapsody at the Sheraton" reappeared on the horizon, however, President Berisha appeared on stage and, in his usual pragmatic style, let the Kosovars know that these were not historic times. It seems that it is more worthwhile to meet a European Union official or a bank governor than the pro-Albanian U.S. Congressman Engel, who was behind the idea of opening the U.S. office in Prishtina.

Berisha Overrates Himself With the Americans

Berisha turned his back on Engel at a time when this congressman, who has influence in the State Depart-

ment, launched the argument for self-determination for the Albanians of Kosova. In Kosova and in its media, as well as in the Albanian political scene, does anyone dare to open his mouth to say something against Berisha?! Engel himself told the BBC that "Mr. Berisha told me that he was very busy and that he could not receive me," without commenting on Berisha's "occupation" with a more important task. Nevertheless, Engel seemed calm and unflustered by Berisha's refusal to see him, just as Benjamin Gilman, leader of the U.S. Congress' Foreign Affairs Committee, showed himself to be very generous. Meanwhile, EU Commissioner Hans Van den Broek visited Tirana and offered Berisha another try at "the mathematics of counting votes" in local elections. Van den Broek urged Tirana to improve the image of democracy in these elections, and it may happen that these second elections determine the destiny of the first ones! However, if by holding elections again, Berisha cultivates tolerance toward the opposition—something which he warned of with the de facto abolition of the Anti-Genocide Law at that level of elections—and if, quite by chance, the opposition wins the majority in the local government, Albania will then inevitably go toward new general elections. On the other hand, another Democratic Party (PD) victory in these elections would ensure [the continuation of] Berisha's government, but not the political stability so badly needed in Albania today.

U.S. Incompatibility With Albania's "Facade" of Democracy

It is an interesting fact that Albanians understand universal democratic principles like those of the free vote and human rights in a somewhat corrupt way. Thus, on the eve of the free general elections in Albania and even after them, a nationalistic euphoria was created both in Tirana and Prishtina that implied that everyone wins if the PD wins, that the final blow was given to the "Red Front," and that democracy triumphed over the communist Serbo-Slav influences and the Greek nationalistic forces of Vlorë Epirus. Then it came out that the Greek-American lobby on Capitol Hill was behind the entire election campaign!

Berisha himself asserted this to some extent, however, forgetting the fact that even some congressmen who have rendered powerful support to the Albanian cause, such as Tom Lantos, etc., are members of this lobby. To tell the truth, Americans sometimes go too far with their strict standards regarding human rights and the free vote just as in the case of the Greek minority in Albania. However, the case of the minority community having spied on behalf of the Greek extremist forces was solved by U.S. mediation. But, at the same time,

Americans were unable to peek through their fingers and see the irregularities in the main elections on 26 May 1996, something that the West Europeans were able to do. This illustrates that West European democracy has many faces, and it can change them according to the needs of the state!

U.S. State Department Spokesman Nicholas Burns was the first to announce U.S. incompatibility with the Albanian "facade" of democracy, stating that elections in Albania should be repeated. Berisha, annoyed, undertook a small step and repeated the elections in 17 constituencies. Just when it was thought that the U.S. criteria were met, it seemed that the United States was not making any concessions. The phantom of the so-called Greek-American lobby was born here, and God knows what its objectives are. However, it is known that this lobby is not committing itself to the restoration of communism in Albania, as several Albanian political circles in Tirana and Prishtina believed. Berisha then spoke of sovereignty, which was the harshest word articulated by a postcommunist head of state since Enver Hoxha made sovereignty the alpha and omega of his powerholding pyramid. The United States has been totally interested in ruining Albanian Stalinism. What the Voice of America alone has done to overthrow communism in Albania has not been matched by all Albanian and West European media combined. To illustrate this, we should mention some known facts.

Apart from supporting the legitimate rights of Albanians in Kosova, the United States has set a new course for the Albanian Army by moving it toward NATO doors, providing overall support, carrying out joint maneuvers, and by engaging Albania in the Partnership for Peace program. It is known that the United States gave Albania about \$300 million during its transition phase, and it is as well known that President Clinton, Secretary of State Christopher, and Secretary of Defense Perry unreservedly supported the democratic processes in Albania. Thus, it would have been political fantasy to think that Americans were plotting behind Berisha's back to endanger the country's sovereignty!

The End of Illusions—The Start of Politics

Both Serbs and Albanians, either in informal talks or in the media, are loudly discussing the possibility of initiating Serb-Albanian negotiations. Asked at his regular news conference whether there was something to the rumors of Prishtina-Belgrade talks, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, president of the Republic of Kosova, answered laconically: "We are working in that direction," revealing nothing and leaving room for various speculation, to the extent that some believe that the talks have started and they continue in secrecy! The Parliamentary Party of

Kosova led by Bajram Kosumi has accused the Democratic League of Kosova and Dr. Rugova himself of "accepting partial talks on the normalization of life, thus putting off a solution to the political status of Kosova" at a time when within the LDK itself there is a great hullabaloo about some lists of experts on economic affairs, including names of former top functionaries of Kosova. Apparently, Dr. Rugova tolerated these lists of experts, thinking ahead to possible Kosovo participation in the former Yugoslavia succession. Some West European circles, and the office of Carl Bildt in particular, have been committed to "normalizing life" in Kosova, but no solid results have been noted.

The Americans and the "outer wall of sanctions," however, continue to remain the sole hope for Kosova, shattered from great expectations. The inauguration of the USIS office in Prishtina was another good occasion for the Albanian and Serbian officials to put forward their views. The Albanians consider this information office a "symbolic presence of the United States in Kosova," raising its stature to that of an embassy, while the Serbs see it as an "accomplishment of a democratic obligation to improve, although very little, the wrecked image that 'Unique Serbia' enjoys in the world." While arguing over some approaches used by Albanian media and demonstrating CD-ROM's with information about the United States, USIS chief David Miis said that "USIS is misunderstood in several circles; this is not an embassy and does not enjoy diplomatic immunity...." At the same time, Albanians rallied in front of the USIS building in Dragodan, chanting "Freedom for Kosova." The Americans, "translating" to Aleksa Jokic [not further identified] what the Albanians wanted, told him: Albanians want freedom! Jokic retorted: They already have freedom! Dr. Rugova would say: We are working in that direction! To tell the truth, the Americans have never demanded independence for the Albanians of Kosova. Nevertheless, Engel pledged to put forward a resolution in Congress that would demand self-determination for Albanians, thereby marking some progress in U.S. policy on Kosova. In the meantime, the State Department is concerned about brutal violations of the human rights of Albanians, and it is asking Belgrade to return educational and cultural institutions, as well as the media, to them. Serbian media discuss more and more often the possibility of these talks. Moreover, those present at the inauguration of the U.S. office in Prishtina say that Jokic was heard to have said: "We have to live together!"

Serbian media also gave great publicity to the project of Transnational Foundation for Peace lead by Jan Oberg. In an interview with the media, Oberg mentioned the very strong ties of Albanians of Kosova to those

of the United States, calling Kosova a "territory in the context." The Serbs are uncomfortable with the term "territory," because it seems to deprive Kosova of Serbian sovereignty. Predrag Simic, director of the Institute for Geostrategic and Economic Studies in Belgrade, however, does not give a lot of importance to this project by the Transnational Foundation for Peace. He states that "there are other projects that are more serious and carry greater influence in the governments of the European Union and the United States, such as projects of Carnegie, Carter, or other foundations." He specifically mentions "a German foundation," alluding to the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. Simic is of the opinion that "to control the Mediterranean, the United States has found in Albania a shelter and views it as its unsinkable aircraft carrier. The United States has practically found in Albania the substitute for what a long time ago was the former Yugoslavia."

The debate in the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, as well as the recurrent statements by officials that "we should talk with the Albanians," are a good testimony to the fact that the Serbs are searching for ways to emerge from the crisis in Kosova. The opinion of Milenko Vucetic in SRPSKA REC seems very rational to me when he says that "considering that there is a conflict in Kosova between two parties with incompatible interests—expressed and verified through polls—to the extent that a compromise agreeable to both sides is impossible, the contention that all rights should be granted to Albanians—at a time when the status of Kosova as an inseparable part of the Serbian state cannot be changed—is not only risky but unrealistic and politically unproductive." In search of the ways to get out of Kosova, Serbia and the Serbs seem to finally call on reason to help them. How to find a solution for Kosova? The respect for the plebiscite of the Albanian majority and the international warranty for the local Serbs is the only solution the Belgrade intellectual circles and the Serbs of the postmyth period of Kosova agree with. It still remains an enigma as to what stance Belgrade will maintain.

It seems that Serbia is hurrying to offer something for Kosova which is not at all close to the will of the Albanians expressed in the plebiscite. Serbia does not have the time to calculate indefinitely. Serbia is convinced that international handling of the Kosova issue must not neglect self-determination for Albanians. The Albanians, however, need another Serbia, one from which they are separated and can respond to without violence.

Anyway, it seems we are approaching the beginning of the end of Serbian great nationalist illusions about the "final annexation of Kosova," but also those of Albanians for the expeditious victory of the national state, even for an expeditious union with Albania. This may perhaps be the start of the political phase.

Bulgaria: Videnov, FRY's Kontic Open Optical Cable Link*AU1408154896 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1500 GMT 14 Aug 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] The official opening of the optical telecommunications cable from Sofia to Nis was the motive for the third meeting between Bulgarian Prime Minister Zhan Videnov and FRY Prime Minister Radoje Kontic. In the common assessment that each of the leaders gave on the dynamic development of cooperation between the two countries, they noted the need for joint actions to liberalize economic relations, set up free trade zones, and create conditions for the free movement of capital and goods.

The new telecommunications line is a concrete expression of the united efforts being made by our two countries to carry out important projects conforming to the highest international standards, Prime Minister Zhan Videnov pointed out. He also stated that, today, when the model of confrontation does not form part of the political scene in modern Europe, we regard our neighbor first and foremost as a partner, and the event today serves as proof of our desire to dynamically develop bilateral relations with neighboring Yugoslavia in the economic, social, humanitarian, and cultural spheres.

For his part, FRY Prime Minister Radoje Kontic pointed out that relations between the two countries are based on mutual respect, good-neighborliness, joint interests, and mutual benefit, and expressed his confidence that on the basis of these principles other important joint projects will be carried out in the future in the communications, energy, ecological, and other fields.

Bulgaria: Kontic 'Highly Assesses' Meeting Results*AU1508155396 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 15 Aug 96 p 1*

[Article by Tanya Geneva: "Videnov, Kontic Inaugurate Optical Link"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The prime ministers of Bulgaria and the FRY, Zhan Videnov and Radoje Kontic, officially inaugurated the first Sofia-Nis optical cable link, which is a part of the Sofia-Belgrade supermodern digital link. The project has been jointly implemented by the Bulgarian Telecommunications Company and the Serbian Company "Posts, Telephones, and Telegraphs." The cable was produced by the Greek Company Tele-cable, and the digital relay system by Siemens.

Both prime ministers stressed that the project has not only an important regional significance, but is also an essential part of the telecommunication link between Europe and Asia. Zhan Videnov pointed out

that developing telecommunications has a priority in developing the Bulgarian economy. According to him, the successful cooperation between Sofia and Belgrade in this sphere is a specific example of how the Balkan problems should be resolved.

Radoje Kontic said that he does not see any obstacles to an even greater activation of relations between the two countries.

The two prime ministers met at the "red line" between Bulgaria and the FRY at precisely 1500 [1200 GMT], after which they withdrew to a private 30-minute talk. Nikola Baltov, cabinet spokesman, told DUMA that Kontic has highly assessed the results of the June meeting in Sofia of Balkan foreign ministers. The heads of the two governments declared their willingness to further liberalize economic relations and create additional free trade zones.

Bulgaria: Athens Reportedly Adopts 'New Balkan Strategy'*AU1608085196 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 16 Aug 96 p 23*

[Staff report: "Athens Prepares New Balkan Policy Involving Priority Relations With Sofia and Skopje"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Athens has developed a new Balkan policy aimed at constructing priority relations with Sofia, Skopje, and Tirana, the Greek newspapers reported on 15 August.

Greece's new Balkan strategy will be discussed by a competent government commission after 20 August. Within the framework of this commission's work, Greek Prime Minister Konstandinos Simitis plans to visit Bulgaria, Albania, Serbia, and Romania between the autumn and the end of the year. His tour will also include a visit to Russia.

The Greek prime minister will announce the basic principles of the new Balkan strategy during the Salonika International Fair in September, well-informed sources pointed out.

Observers point out that Greece has resorted to this change in its foreign policy because of the deterioration of its relations with Ankara against the background of the tension in Cyprus. Greece wants to protect its back prior to entering a sharp confrontation with Turkey. The quarrels about the name of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and the tense relations with Albania are a liability at present against the background of the exacerbation of the Greek-Turkish crisis.

Informed circles point out that Athens will have no problems with the Bulgarian socialist cabinet in implementing its new strategy. Therefore, improving Sofia-Belgrade relations implies that the Greece-Serbia-Romania axis could include also Bulgaria. However, Skopje would certainly view the proposal to improve relations as a Byzantine move. Skopje thinks that Athens simply wants a temporary truce with Macedonia and is not prepared to any compromises regarding the former Yugoslav republic.

Bulgaria: Opposition Urged To Develop Ties to Moscow

AL 1508151396 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian
15 Aug 96 p 6

[Article by Panayot Denev: "Stoyanov To Try To Restore Friendship With Moscow"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Presidential candidate Petur Stoyanov has several good reasons to refrain from a new visit to the United States. Excellently informed sources point out that one of the reasons is related to giving a new nuance to the election campaign of the united opposition's candidate.

Eliminating all losing factors in the old image of the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), the Ivan Kostov (SDS leader)-Petur Stoyanov duo certainly understands that a link to big brother is important. Therefore, the rumor according to which an envoy of Petur Stoyanov has sought political contacts at the highest level in Moscow, has a convincing logic in it.

Such a move would be very natural. The united opposition is seeking trump cards for the conduct of a positive election campaign, but is not ignoring any failure of the socialist government. Despite the attempts to carefully conceal this, the failure of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) to use Russia as the saving straw was a strong slap in its face.

Since the failure of the first Moscow coup against Gorbachev on 22 August 1991 and until today, the BSP has failed to achieve a synchronization with its ostensibly natural allies in the Kremlin. It is an open question whether the BSP really has allies there.

Moscow does not forget easily. The Kremlin archive certainly keeps traces of the frantic shuttle missions of USSR Ambassador Viktor Sharapov to the socialist cabinets in Eastern Europe and Dimitur Popov's cabinet during the first day of the coup about five years ago. The Kremlin remembers the open hostility of our leftist press toward Yeltsin prior to the presidential elections in Russia this summer. The Bulgarians understood that Videnov, Sendov (National Assembly chairman), and

Paparizov [Minister of trade and foreign economic relations] all failed in their attempts to reach any agreements with the Russian partners.

For Russia, Bulgaria today is the least favorite nation.

Finally, the noise related to the various gas deals ended. Even a politician as closely linked to Moscow as Andrey Lukanov admits that "the current trade-economic regime does not allow the development of favorable economic cooperation."

The BSP was also deceived in making the humiliating reverences it constantly made to Serbia during the war and the embargo because of Moscow. Belgrade turned its back to Sofia and the agitation of the Slavonic and Eastern Orthodox clowns stopped.

Moscow is tired of the servile behavior of the old ideological brothers from Sofia. This simply is a catastrophe in one of the most loudly heralded priorities of Videnov's program.

No one in Moscow approves of the Bulgarian cabinet's obstinate behavior toward the international financial institutions. They most likely do not approve of such primitive campaigns as the hysteria around the "Open Society" in the local socialist press. Money from both the IMF and Soros is welcome in Russia. There they do not view foreign advice and financial injections as "nightmares of treason."

The united opposition must be crazy to miss this chance in its election campaign. They would certainly utilize also President Zhelev's strong positions in relations with Yeltsin.

Except for several stupid statements by the wildest SDS agitators during this union's emotional period, the anticommunist opposition in Bulgaria never denied the importance of having good relations with Russia. Today the possibility opens to place those relations on a new foundation.

However, it would be much more difficult to cut the tentacles of the old and already exceptionally strong Bulgarian-Russian Mafia. The only possibility of doing this is in developing cooperation between the two governments.

Apparently the BSP today is not a desirable partner for Yeltsin, not only because of its helplessness and lethal, closed character, but also because of the 1970's in which the Bulgarian Communists did not adopt a single independent political decision.

Under the leadership of the BSP and Videnov, Bulgaria turned into an election propaganda scarecrow for the Russian voters. Only the most hard-core communist

voters still believe that there would be someone in Moscow who would try to revive "real socialism."

Bulgaria: Cabinet Proposes Promotion of 44 Senior Officers

AU1608085396 Sofia STANDART NEWS
in Bulgarian 16 Aug 96 p 3

[Article by Lidiya Kotseva: "Army Reshuffle Involving 44 High-Ranking Officers Proposed to Zhelev"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 15 August, the cabinet proposed to President Zhelev that he sign decrees involving the promotion of 44 officers.

However, 50 percent of those proposed for promotion have not graduated from the General Staff Academy, as the new Armed Forces Law requires. Aleksandur Petrov, adviser to the prime minister on military issues, stressed that they will have to complete their studies. For a period of one year, they will implement the duties of the new post without having the actual rank. During this period, they will have to graduate from the academy or retire.

The Ministry of Defense is applying pressure to organize General Staff courses for the 44 officers, without interrupting their actual functions.

Major General Mikho Mikhov remains Air Force commander. He will have three new deputies. The former

adviser to the president, Maj. Gen. Nikola Kolev, has been proposed for the post of General Staff chief. Generals Krustyo Krustev and Iliya Parapunov have been proposed for the posts of Air Force Corps chiefs. Maj. Gen. Kalcho Tanev will become Civil Defense commander, while Colonel Dimitur Tsvetkov will become commander of the Technical Aviation.

The current deputy commander of the 1st Army Corps, Maj. Gen. Tsanko Dolinski will become Military Police chief. Maj. Gen. Ivan Dobrev will retain his current post. Maj. Gen. Stefan Nikolov will become 2d Army Corps commander.

Maj. Gen. Khristo Vasilev will become deputy chief of the General Staff. He has also been proposed for promotion to the rank of lieutenant general.

Gen. Kiril Ermenkov, until now chief of the Military Academy, and Gen. Angel Katsarov, Military Intelligence chief, have again been proposed for membership of the Army Inspectorate. In the spring, President Zhelev refused to approve their appointment to the Inspectorate. Lt. Gen. Angel Angelov has been proposed to the post of commandant of the Military Academy.

There is only one change in the Navy—Captain Petur Petrov becomes deputy chief of the General Staff.

Slovakia: President Comments on Cooperation With FRY

AU1508183296 *Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 15 Aug 96*

[Interview with Slovak President Michal Kovac by Tatjana Lenard at Economic Forum in Salzburg; date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Lenard] How should the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Slovak Republic improve their cooperation in the future?

[Kovac] I think that the foundations, or new foundations for this cooperation were laid during the recent visit of our prime minister to Yugoslavia. We know from the past that we had very good contacts, that we have experience in cooperation and that we know how to cooperate, but we were waiting for the embargo to be lifted, for peace to be established in the former Yugoslavia. Our country is ready to renew all political, economic, and other contacts with your country.

Slovakia: Concern About 'Peaceful Change' to Borders

AU1508133696 *Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 14 Aug 96 p 3*

[Commentary by Roman Hofbauer: "Is Slovakia at Risk From a Peaceful Change to Its Borders?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Our media has been citing in recent days the gratifying and satisfied statements by our foreign policy representatives about the U.S. rejection of the principle of collective ethnic rights and its recognition of exclusively individual ethnic rights. The Slovak side was immediately happy to interpret this as confirmation by the United States of the unchangeability of our state borders and the unacceptability of ethnic autonomy. Is this, however, absolutely true? Are we not, by chance, merely seizing upon that part of its foreign policy stance that we want to discern, because only this part of the superpower's stance suits us?

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), with which U.S. foreign policy concepts are, to a considerable extent, associated, allows in its documents for the possibility of a peaceful change to the state borders of countries on the ethnic principle on the basis of negotiations and agreements. The doctrines of the OSCE and U.S. foreign policy are identical. Czech-born U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright, who visited Slovakia recently, has conveyed foreign political stances in the United Nations that are identical with the point of view of the OSCE. We are referring to her stances. However, M. Albright's contacts with the Czechoslovak National Council of America—

which had its *raison d'être* in the 1948-89 period, but whose activity after 1989 seemed obsolete, while the preservation of this institution after 1 January 1993 is a monument to an incomprehensible ossified relic and betrays an ignorance of the sovereign Slovak Republic—are no secret.

It is worth remembering the OSCE's point of view on the alleged developments on the Slovak domestic political scene prepared for the U.S. Congress in the second half of 1993. The point of view contained a grossly tendentious distorted negative image of Slovakia, including complete lies, and represented the start of a coordinated purposeful negative mass media campaign directed from the United States against the independent Slovak Republic, which is continuing to this day to an increasing extent.

Not only the United Nations, but also the notorious "Orme-Marton" organization for the protection of journalists producing lies about the situation in the mass media in Slovakia, is based in New York; it is also in communication with the U.S. Congress. The Foundation for a Civil Society is also based in New York. It acts as a distributor funnel for funds from the most influential U.S. circles for the "nonprofitmaking nonstate sector" in Slovakia...

If the United States, as the main director and coordinator of the current global political scene, rejects collective rights on the ethnic principle and recognizes individual rights, then we are catching a very discreet glimpse of another aspect of the U.S. foreign policy doctrine: The possibility of a peaceful change to state borders as a result of agreements and negotiations. We have reasons for this.

In the past, our state borders were changed by peaceful means as a result of the "peacemaking negotiations" and agreements in Munich and Vienna, and the future development in Central Europe was also decided upon by "peaceful" means, by negotiations, in Berlin on 13 March 1939.

The guarantees for our statehood at that time were oriented so unilaterally that it was enough for our guarantors, France and England, to interpret their stance differently at the peacemaking negotiations and suddenly everything was different. We did not fare any better at the joint peace talks involving the representatives of the Warsaw Pact states in Bratislava on 18 August 1968, when we took from the joint communiqués only what suited us and did not pay attention to the passage that presaged a "peacemaking" armed intervention by the armies of our treaty partners justified by the need to suppress the risks of counterrevolution and protect peace

and democracy and the subsequent overthrowing of our state's political and government orientation.

We remember all of this very well!

Slovakia: Interior Minister Claims Phone Conversation Tapped

AU1608094796 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
14 Aug 96 p 2

[CTK report: "Minister Hudek Has Submitted a Complaint"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—According to Interior Minister Ludovit Hudek, the expert analyses carried out by Slovak criminologists "show unequivocally that tampering was involved" in the recording of the alleged telephone conversation between him and secret service chief Ivan Lexa. Despite this, however, the minister has submitted a complaint against the persons who illegally recorded the telephone conversation. He confirmed the existence of the Slovak expert analysis regarding the authenticity of the recording on Tuesday (13 August). "I have submitted a complaint against those who illegally recorded the telephone conversation," said Hudek. According to him, the police are now focusing on the issue of defamation of character, which is, in his opinion, far more important than whether "the recording is or is not" (authentic). "We are awaiting the decision of the investigators," he added.

Slovakia: Defense Fund for Prosecuted Citizens Established

96CH0159A Prague PRAGUE POST in English
3-9 Jul 96 p 4

[Article by Siegfried Morkowitz: "Czech Fund Set Up To Fight Slovak Oppression"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Resistance to continued political oppression in Slovakia is growing—in the Czech Republic. A group of Slovak political exiles and prominent Czechs have joined forces in Prague to establish a charitable fund for the defense of Slovak citizens prosecuted for their political opinions.

According to Vojtech Fejfar, the founder of the fund *A sam* (And Alone), the principal support it offers is financial. "It will concentrate on aiding those people who cannot afford to pay their court fees or fines defending themselves against the government," he said.

Fejfar, a former deputy director of the Kosice branch of the Czechoslovak Federal Security and Intelligence Service (FBIS), left Slovakia with his family in 1992 and became a naturalized Czech citizen. He established *A sam* because, in his words, "Though the (Slovak) government claims that there is democratic evolution

in the country, I believe the everyday activity of the government says just the opposite."

As an example of what Fejfar sees as the true state of civil rights in Slovakia, he cited the case of Andrej Samel, a former Czechoslovak deputy interior minister, who in 1991 warned his countrymen of what he called the ambition for absolute power of the current Slovak prime minister, Vladimir Meciar. "In his memoirs, which were widely publicized," Fejfar said, "Samel compared Meciar to Mussolini and Hitler and discussed Meciar's unofficial contacts with the KGB."

Samel also accused the Slovak prime minister of "having the capacity to lie, play tricks and cheat."

The consequences for Samel, Fejfar said, were that Meciar filed a lawsuit against him claiming 850,000 Sk (\$27,400) in damages. In November 1991, the case was dismissed by the Slovak courts. A new suit was filed in 1992, asking the same sum in damages. The case was repeatedly postponed until 1995, when a district court in Banska Bystrica found Samel guilty of defamation and ordered him to pay 60,000 Sk in damages, a sum that Samel, now working as a night watchman, cannot pay.

According to Fedor Gal, former advisor to the Czechoslovak prime minister and member of the fund's central board (other board members include ODA deputy chairman Daniel Kroupa and film director Vlastimil Venclik), the Samel case was the reason the fund was established. "But there are hundreds of similar cases," he said. Among the more prominent examples of government persecution, Gal mentioned Peter Vacok, the former investigator in the kidnapping case of Michal Kovac Jr., and Peter Toth, a journalist for the opposition daily SME, who wrote about the case.

According to the writer and poet Lubomir Feldek, himself a victim of "legal" government persecution (*see accompanying report [not reproduced here]*), "Civil law, which was designed to protect the individual citizen, has become an instrument of political oppression in Slovakia. There is now a fear, on the basis of experience, that if you speak out against the government, you will be charged or, at the very least, experience some unpleasantness."

A sam was formally registered as a charitable foundation on June 14. Since then, Gal said, it has received around 20,000 Kc (\$740) in donations to help Samel pay his attorney and, if necessary, his fine. According to Gal, the fund is faced with three crucial problems: publicity, money and information. "We need to monitor the situation in Slovakia," he said. "Without correct

and valid information about the individual cases of persecution in Slovakia, we cannot function."

Gal mentioned a case that had just come to his attention, a man claiming to be hounded by the police because of his political beliefs. "But the documents I have seen are not clear," Gal said. "We have very little information about the situation."

But the situation in Slovakia is critical, said Gal. He referred to a May 22 speech in the Slovak Parliament by Ivan Lexa, the head of the Slovak Intelligence Service (SIS), in which Lexa accused opposition leaders, journalists and foreigners—specifically naming Gal—of trying to subvert the Slovak state.

"This was the same rhetoric as we heard in the '50s during the show trials," said Gal, who is suing Lexa for defamation. Gal went on to say that "the political situation in Slovakia now is much like it was before the 1989 revolution. Many former StB (communist secret police) agents who were thrown out of the government are now back at work."

Fejfar produced several articles from the Slovak daily LUC which he claims are intended to smear political opponents of the state. (Both Fejfar and Gal referred to LUC as a particularly vicious organ of the Slovak state). One of these articles, dated June 12, two days before *A sam*'s registration, is entitled "Do the threads lead to the hundred spires?" referring to Prague.

The article, bearing the byline Dusan Slezak, accuses by innuendo a certain "L.F." connected with a "mysterious organization called FENDIK" and "V.F.," "today employed at the BIS (Czech intelligence service) in Prague," of past involvement in a murky scandal in Kosice which, the story alleges, "bears signs of espionage."

"L.F." probably refers to Lubomir Feldek, while "V.F." can only be *A sam* founder Vojtech Fejfar, who today works as an administrative clerk in the Czech Interior Ministry.

Gal fears that *A sam* is ill-equipped to handle the many pleas for help that will come in. "We are only six people on the board and we all have jobs," Gal said. "I'm afraid that with the hundreds of people who will contact us, we won't have the time to make a correct decision."

As of now, *A sam* lacks both office and staff, and the funds to procure them. "One million Kc (\$37,000) is the minimum we need to begin doing an adequate job," Gal said.

[Box, p 4]

The Case of Lubomir Feldek

In 1992, the Slovak writer Lubomir Feldek demanded in public that the Slovak Minister of Culture at the time, Dusan Slobodnik, resign because of his fascist past. In addition, Feldek wrote a poem that contained the line "the SS man has embraced the StB (communist secret police) man."

The reference, says Feldek, is to Slobodnik's participation as a young man in a special training program organized by Slovakia's Nazi SS, known as the Hlinka Guard. "This does not necessarily make him a fascist," Feldek admits. "But a private citizen should have the right to inquire into a politician's past."

Slobodnik reacted by suing Feldek on Sept. 7, 1992, for defamation of character, asking for a public apology and 200,000 Sk (\$6,500) in damages. The municipal court of Bratislava, says Feldek, "proved itself to be impartial and independent and dismissed all the charges after five sessions."

Slobodnik, however, was undeterred. In October 1993, he went to the Slovak Supreme Court, which five months later decided in his favor. Feldek, a founding member of the Slovak dissident movement Public Against Violence, was ordered to write a public apology and pay the entire 200,000 Sk in damages.

Feldek describes what happened next as "a wave of solidarity concerning my case." Charter 77 and many individuals contributed money to pay his fine. Among the first to give financial support, says Feldek, were Czech President Vaclav Havel and former dissident and Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier. As a result, Feldek views *A sam* as "an absolutely good idea, because this kind of aid is a great psychological support, as it was in my case."

Feldek eventually appealed his case in the Appeals Senate, which returned the case to the municipal court for a final ruling. In May of this year, all damages in the case were dropped. The unrelenting Slobodnik, however, has appealed for damages again.

According to Feldek, the case continues. "Because of my visibility as a former dissident and a writer, my case was meant to have an intimidating effect on others," he says.

So far, about 350,000 Slovak and Czech crowns have been donated to his case. If charges against him are dismissed, he says, the money will be used to help others in similar situations.

Slovakia: Statistical Office Reports on Budget Deficit*AU1608094896 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 14 Aug 96 p 1*

[CTK report: "The Slovak State Budget Deficit Has Reached Sk6.129 Billion"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The Slovak state budget recorded a deficit of 6.129 billion korunas [Sk] for the first half year. According to the Slovak Statistical Office, based on the approved budget, the projected deficit for the whole year is set at Sk27 billion. State budget revenue for the first half year amounted to Sk79.5 billion, which means that the annual budget—according to which revenue is planned to amount to Sk162.4 billion—has been 49-percent fulfilled. State budget expenditure amounted to Sk85.6 billion, that is, 45.2 percent of annual expenditure, which is planned to amount to Sk189.4 billion.

In June, the Slovak Government made note of the basic macroeconomic and budgetary starting points for compiling the 1997 state budget. According to them, the state budget for next year should have revenue of Sk185 billion and expenditure of Sk200 billion. The recommended limit for next year's deficit has been set at Sk25 billion.

Slovakia: Hungarians Unhappy With Text of Treaty With Romania*LD1508180596 Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian 1600 GMT 15 Aug 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Because of the compromises of the Romanian-Hungarian basic treaty, the ethnic

Hungarian politicians in Slovakia have initiated talks with the UDMR [Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania].

We find it extremely unsettling that the Hungarian foreign affairs state secretary [Ferenc Somogyi] went to Bucharest with instructions to compromise on the issues of collective rights and autonomy, said Miklos Duray, chairman of ethnic Hungarian party Coexistence. According to Duray, the Budapest interpretation of Recommendation No 1201 of the Council of Europe, according to which it does not support the creation of a special status for minorities based on collective rights, means that the Hungarian Government has taken a stand against every kind of autonomy endeavor of the Hungarians living beyond the borders. The situation of ethnic Hungarians living in Romania and Slovakia, however, cannot be solved without collective rights.

In response to a question by [Duna TV] news, Duray said that the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty would be judged by the Romanian-Hungarian basic treaty, which was dated later. Therefore, wholly sharing the concerns of the UDMR, the Hungarian Coalition of Slovakia [umbrella organization of ethnic Hungarian parties in Slovakia] has initiated a meeting with the UDMR leadership for 19 August to discuss the possible consequences.

Hungary: Government Statement on Improved Relations With Romania

LD1508172296 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 15 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The draft of the Hungarian-Romanian Basic Treaty was one of the issues discussed at the government session today. Peter Gyuricza is on the line.

[Gyuricza] The government issued a statement on the Hungarian-Romanian Basic Treaty and on the expert talks that took place in Bucharest regarding the reconciliation documents. I quote two sentences from the statement:

The government expresses its conviction that the improvement in Hungarian-Romanian relations completely satisfies Hungary's national interests, contributes to the region's security and stability, and promotes the two countries' Euro-Atlantic integration. The government confirms its view that the recognition of the inviolability of the borders and the guaranteeing of minority rights in line with European norms are preconditions for the improvement of relations.

Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs told me that he had written a letter to the Hungarian opposition parties and had called together the parliamentary group leaders for a consultation on the issue tomorrow.

Hungary: Trade, Industry Minister Seeks Retirement

LD1508121396 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 15 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Imre Dunai, Hungarian Minister of Industry and Trade has asked to retire. This is

what he said in reply to a question from Hungarian Radio. The government official said that Prime Minister Gyula Horn had not yet decided whether to accept the retirement request, but they had agreed not to comment for six months on what had happened. Dunai did not attend the government session this morning.

According to several newspapers, the minister of industry and trade wants to leave his position because, for professional reasons, he regards a higher energy price increase to be justified than what Prime Minister Gyula Horn—who is bearing social welfare considerations in mind—believes is acceptable.

It is not known whether the issue of the industry minister's departure was discussed at the government session, which is devoted primarily to next year's taxes. [passage omitted]

Hungary: Prime Minister Accepts Industry Minister's Resignation

LD1508172196 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 15 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Gyula Horn has accepted Industry and Trade Minister Imre Dunai's resignation. Laszlo Judit reports on the government spokesman's briefing:

[Begin recording] [Laszlo] It was said by the government spokesman that Prime Minister Gyula Horn had accepted the industry minister's resignation. Imre Dunai asked for his retirement for health reasons.

There was no mention of how long he would stay in office or who would succeed him. By the way, the name of the ministry will change to the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Tourism. [end recording]

B-H: Muratovic, Zubak, Ganic Sign Accord on Federal Institutions*AU1508194896 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 15 Aug 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Hasan Muratovic, prime minister of the Republic, Federation President Kresimir Zubak, and Federation Vice President Ejup Ganic, signed behind closed doors in Sarajevo today the agreed measures on the urgent steps to set up federal institutions and structures. The document says that it was necessary to take urgent steps to dissolve the institutions of the so-called Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia by 31 August and integrate them into appropriate ministries of the Federation.

Those functions and institutions of the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina that are not in line with the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina will also be transferred onto the Federation or dissolved.

The signatories have agreed among other things, in complying with this and earlier agreements on the Federation and the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to do the following:

The government and the institutions of the Federation should have all the powers, personnel, authority, and funds to take on the responsibilities on the basis of the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Federation. The institutions set up on the basis of the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina should have only those powers, authority, personnel, and funds that are in line with the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Only those offices, institutions, and other bodies that do not belong the Federation, but are in line with Annex 2 of the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Article 9 of Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina may continue to operate on the territory of the Federation.

The prime ministers of the Republic and the Federation will make sure that the powers, qualified staff, authority, and the funds of the central government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as those from the territory of the Federation under the control of the HVO [Croat Defense Council], be transferred to the appropriate bodies of the Federation in line with the respective rules and regulations.

The president and the vice president of the Federation, together with the republican prime minister, will ensure that all public enterprises operating on the territory of the Federation become public cantonal or federal enterprises, or corporations of Bosnia-Herzegovina in line with Annex 9 of the framework peace agreement.

The president and the vice president of the Federation, in cooperation with the republican prime minister, will immediately name the officials to be transferred to the Federation, and ensure that all offices, institutions, or other public bodies in the Federation use exclusively federal insignia by 15 September this year at the latest.

It has also been agreed that the Supreme Court of the Federation meet by 1 September this year at the latest, and that a special group be set up to monitor those areas in which the powers of the Federation and the central government have not been clearly designated. This group will be assisted by the United States and the office of the high representative.

The agreed measures envisage urgent setting up of the Council for the Implementation of the Federation. An agreement on the federal insignia, the organization of Sarajevo, and the administration and territorial organization of the federal bodies should be reached by 1 September.

B-H: Kapetanovic Says Herzeg-Bosnia To Be Abolished 1 Sep*AU1608074796 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 15 Aug 96 p 3*

[Article by H. Arifagic: "We Are Not Going To Merely Put Out Fires"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Through its activity, the Government of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation has reduced the jurisdiction and activities of the government of the so-called Herzeg-Bosnia to a great extent. Thanks to the recent activities of the Federation Forum, the functions and authorities of the so-called Herzeg-Bosnia are expected to be absolutely transferred to the authorities of the Federation in the coming days. Federation Prime Minister Prof. Dr. Izudin Kapetanovic told OSLOBODJENJE on 14 August that Herzeg-Bosnia will be definitely abolished on 1 September.

"As of that day, the Government of the Federation will finally have space to act and laws that will integrally cover that space," Dr. Kapetanovic said. He pointed to reconstruction, building the institutions of power in the Federation, and macroeconomic policy with the market economy and rapid and efficient privatization as the main goals of the Government of the Federation in the coming period.

The prime minister expressed satisfaction with the pace at which unity is being realized. Everything is going on according to the plan established by the Federation Government. The plan also envisages the way some institutions of the Republic whose powers belong to the Federation should improve the work of the Federation

Government. This, above all, applies to finance, public enterprises, defense, and the police.

When we realize that plan in full, the Federation Government will be able to assist in the normalization of people's lives and reconstruction to a far greater extent than to date.

"The Federation project in this government is led by an executive operations body. The fact that some people look upon it in an irresponsible way is another story, but I will do everything I can to make them take it very seriously. We are tired of misunderstandings," the prime minister of the Federation said.

Pointing to the importance of the extraordinary meeting of the Constituent Assembly scheduled for the end of this month, Dr. Kapetanovic said that the government has submitted 12 bills to be adopted, and one more such package will be submitted before the session is held.

This package contains systemic laws, above all those regulating privatization, such as the purchase of flats and the restitution and privatization of firms. The next package will include bills on the privatization agency, a set of health service laws, laws on the state administration, taxation....

He pointed to the need to clearly define the recipients of taxation revenues at the level of the state, Federation, cantons, and municipalities, "because the present situation in this sphere is nothing else but chaos." In his opinion, as long as that is not defined, the Federation Government will lack the conditions for normal work.

"The forthcoming Constituent Assembly session will round up the part of the government program referring to forming the institutions of the Federation. It is clear that agreements cannot be implemented without the institutions and mechanisms of the Federation. If this is not done, everything will remain at the level of politics, and politics can conceal all sorts of things, including anarchy," Dr. Kapetanovic said.

He commented on all the solutions adopted so far, saying they are "partial, as they were only putting out fires, and the Federation Government does not want to be a fire brigade." He said that this is not only his stand, but also that of the government.

"You should see the Sarajevo agreement and what Mr. Zubak, Mr. Ganic, and Mr. Kapetanovic achieved. The same goes for the Washington agreement. This government is the first serious participant in the Federation project. However, if some people continue to view the government in the same way, I must tell them that they are very wrong," Dr. Izudin Kapetanovic told OSLO-BODJENJE at the end.

B-H: Zubak Comments on Agreement To Dissolve Herzeg-Bosnia

LD1508185196 Zagreb HTV Television
in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 15 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] "Agreed Measures" is the name of the document signed at the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo today by Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation President Kresimir Zubak, Federation Vice President Ejup Ganic, and Bosnia-Herzegovina Republic Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic.

[Unidentified correspondent] The document should have been signed on 8 August at the session of the Forum of the Federation, but this was not done because of opposition from the Muslim Bosniak side. However, the partners today guaranteed with their signatures that in a short period of time—by the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina—they would complete the establishment of the federal authorities. It was also confirmed that the transfer of authority from the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia would run concurrently with the transfer of authority from the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation.

[Begin Zubak recording] We signed the general agreement today. What President Tudjman and Mr. Izetbegovic signed yesterday was just the first part of these "Agreed Measures" that I signed today together with Ganic and Muratovic. [end recording]

[Correspondent] According to the agreement, the Bosniak side should disband some 40 republican institutions, including those established after the Dayton agreement, such as the agency for research and documentation. The disbanding of these institutions will take place in keeping with Annex 1 of the "Agreed Measures," on which a debate will continue tomorrow.

[Begin Zubak recording] The special document we will discuss tomorrow will cover each area separately—defense, internal affairs, foreign affairs, health, energy, agriculture, etc.—and for each area, we will agree which measures need to be taken, as well as the deadlines and those in charge of implementation.

This is where we will have real problems as we demand that this process run simultaneously, i.e., the disbanding of the Interior Ministry should be carried out at the same time as the disbanding of the agency for research and documentation. This is where we will have problems.

Speaking about the Defense Ministry, it should be disbanded simultaneously with the disbanding of the Defense Ministry of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, as well as another service employing over 3,000 which has no official name in the republican

Defense Ministry, but we know about it and we know it is functioning within the Defense Ministry. [end recording]

[Correspondent] The talks between the partners will resume tomorrow. John Menzies, U.S. ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina, will also attend.

B-H: Izetbegovic Welcomes Christopher at Sarajevo Airport

AU1508201496

[FBIS Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1700 GMT on 15 August carries a four-minute report on the arrival of U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher in Sarajevo to open Sarajevo Airport to civilian flights. Reception is very poor.

Christopher is welcomed at the airport building by Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency President Alija Izetbegovic. The correspondent states that "the two statesmen addressed the journalists, as well as the many politicians and members of the public who came to attend the ceremony to open Sarajevo Airport."

Izetbegovic addresses those in attendance, in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation. He emphasizes that this is "an important event for Sarajevo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. After more than 15 months, Sarajevo has been opened for civilian flights." He notes that this first flight "is more than an ordinary flight. This is one more step to freedom." Izetbegovic then expresses gratitude to "the IFOR troops, who carried out a large part of the job, as well as to international (?civilian) organizations and the Bank for Reconstruction and Development. We accept future cooperation with them—and there still much to be done."

Izetbegovic then comments on the 14 August Geneva meeting with Croatian President Tudjman and Serbian President Milosevic calling it "a major step." He then says that "progress was also made (?yesterday) when the city council was constituted in Mostar. The role of the United States is indispensable. I assure you that our government will do everything in its power with a view to continuing positive trends; we have here all necessary preconditions for [word indistinct] and democracy in the integral Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as the promotion of peace and stability in this part of the world."

Following Izetbegovic's speech, the meeting is addressed by Warren Christopher, who speaks about the significance of the upcoming elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and by Deputy IFOR commander General (John Finley), who comments on reconstruction works.

B-H: HDZ President Interviewed on Mostar, Federal Relations

AU1508194396 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST
in Serbo-Croatian 10 Aug 96 pp 10-11

[Interview with Bozo Rajic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina HDZ, by Jozo Pavkovic; place and date not given: "We Consider the Mostar Elections To Be Legally Incomplete"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The fourth assembly of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] of Bosnia-Herzegovina was held last weekend, and Bozo Rajic was reelected president. However, we began our interview with the dominant topic of Mostar.

[Pavkovic] The resolution of the Mostar crisis has been interpreted as a victory of the HDZ. What is your opinion on the recent events in Mostar?

[Rajic] The agreement on Mostar, named "Joint Action," is a compromise. It would be inaccurate to interpret a compromise as a victory of either side. Perhaps it would be best to say that it is a victory of political wisdom in the necessities imposed both by the relations within the town itself and by the immense interest of the international community in finding a solution. The intent of "Joint Action" is to establish the town council on the results of the elections. A Croat representative will be appointed mayor, and the Federal Supreme Court will make the final decision on the whole case, as the Mostar branch of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina requested. The agreement took that into consideration and ruled out the possibilities of prejudiced legal attitudes of the parties in the agreement and biased regulations in the Statute of the City of Mostar. When we bear that in mind, we see that it would be dangerous to talk about the victory of one side. The agreement has opened the process of the establishment of Mostar's functions. We still have to undergo the implementation. We will need much patience, cooperation, and mutual respect in that period.

[Pavkovic] The entire world participated in finding the solution of the Mostar crisis. What interests does the world have in Mostar?

[Rajic] There is not a smallest place in the world that is out of the sight and interest of the international political factors. Mostar and Bosnia-Herzegovina are places where current interests of numerous factors of international politics meet. EU conducts and supports the peace project in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it is only logical that the entire world is involved. The most influential members of the international community find it a matter of principle to help the EU, and the EU finds that an extremely important matter of dignity. Naturally, in

making a compromise, issues are classified according to the priority system that is not necessarily equivalent to ours, but one must either comply with the wish of the international community—in the broadest sense of the word—or be excommunicated. My expectations concerning the future relations in Mostar and the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina are that the positive pressure will be distributed equally on all who are involved in certain issues. Although we did our best to make a compromise, the HDZ has retained the attitude that the problem of the Mostar elections is not completed in the legal aspect. We will insist on a response to our complaint, but the response must come from the Supreme Court of the Federation—not from the Supreme Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which has already given its verdict, despite not being qualified for this matter. We consider its decision to be invalid. It is very dangerous to use a court as a political tool.

[Pavkovic] The assembly of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina was held last weekend. How would you evaluate its work?

[Rajic] It was a good time for the Fourth Assembly of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In my opinion, and not only mine, it was a gathering in which the unity and strength of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina were brought to light, and important messages were sent to the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. All participants and guests can assure you that it was an assembly full of democratic will, without any prejudices. Our discussions and decisions were on a high political level. It was in accordance with the tradition of the modern world and the principles of the international community. All that proves that the HDZ is a very unified party, which also has favorable varieties within the general guidelines of its politics. The conclusions of the reports and the discussions are an encouragement to the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also a message that they should preserve their unity by gathering around our party. Our party is the pillar and the only guarantee of progress in the upcoming time of peace and equality.

[Pavkovic] What are the HDZ's most important strategic directions in the upcoming period?

[Rajic] Our strategic directions have been given by the Program Principles of the HDZ. Those mainly specified our vital goals and strategy. Our political pragmatism relies on the tasks of the current political situation—in short, on Dayton and Washington. That means that we will fight for peace and offer peace to everyone. In order to last, that peace must have righteous foundations—within the framework of the agreements that we have accepted, of course. People should accept it believing that they will be free and have equal rights, and that

the time will come when there will be no calculating or outwitting aimed at gaining political advantage on the expense of the other side. That is extremely important for the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Naturally, the return of displaced Croats who have been scattered all over the world is our priority in that context, as well as the reconstruction and encouragement of all positive aspects of life. The establishment of the Federation, as we have arranged it, will make that possible. We have to fight the forces that are trying to get around those arrangements, because uprightness in the Federation is the only way to promote the full reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where our national interests are of a great importance. Having the support of the Republic of Croatia and the HDZ as a worldwide party is not a matter of our choice anymore. It is a matter of our survival, especially if we know how much our people want to be a part of the western civilization where we have always belonged.

[Pavkovic] Was the Fourth Assembly also a part of the election campaign of the HDZ?

[Rajic] The assembly of our party was held two years after the last one, and our statute specified that an assembly should be held after that period. However, the timing was perfect for the election campaign, and the Fourth Assembly of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina certainly was an introduction to the campaign and an incentive of the party and national energy. It will help us achieve the best possible results in the September elections despite all the abrogating circumstances, impediments, and very unusual electoral regulations. We need as much unity as we can get, because the September elections are extremely important for the nations of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the implementation of the Washington and Dayton agreements. If we are aware of that, it is logical to make the maximum effort to stimulate the Bosnian Croats and other citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina who have recognized the values of our party. That will help the HDZ to remain the legitimate representative of the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina and fulfill the tasks specified in our program, at least until we achieve the lasting peace and the equal and stable status for the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We can be and want to be an active political factor in that process, but we cannot afford any political ignorance. We must have an answer to every possible challenge.

[Pavkovic] What will the future political situation of the Bosnian Croats be like?

[Rajic] A great majority of the Bosnian Croats will keep supporting the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina after the upcoming elections. Frankly, I cannot see any serious

political rivals. Certain Croatian parties might make use of the fact that Croats in certain parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina are not satisfied with the peace agreement. Civic-oriented parties—allegedly civic-oriented—will crash. We must bear in mind that certain political ideas are sponsored from abroad. Nevertheless, I am aware of the political maturity of the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I know that odds are against the parties whose names contain words such as multicultural or multiethnic, while their actual intentions are to form a unitarian state where Croats will be a minority.

[Pavkovic] According to certain opinions, political unity might be broken if more than one party enters the elections.

[Rajic] Although politics is a prestigious domain of human activities, every responsible member of a nation knows that the benefit of his nation is more important than his personal ambitions, especially in crucial times like these.

Unnatural coalitions might trouble the Croat political scene in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as the state-creating political parties. However, I believe that such offers will be ephemeral, and that they will not bring about any substantial results or damage.

[Pavkovic] How much will the September elections affect the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Rajic] They certainly are of special importance. It is difficult to tell how much they will affect the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but they will—in correlation with the peace project—certainly give us answers that we lack at the moment. If the political choice of the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina turns out to be similar to the one in 1990, it will be a message that will give a certain stimulus to the political life of Bosnia-Herzegovina. If the result is, for instance, a more variegated scene, with an increased influence of civic parties and their political options, the political choice will change. Accordingly, the implementation measures of the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina will change, too. Still, regardless of the possible processes after the elections, it is of a vital importance for the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina to preserve national and political unity, so they can actualize their right to an equal status by means of constitutional and legal solutions. As to the possible political directions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, I believe that the guidance of the international community will remain decisive and, I hope, strike a balance in the contrarities that have piled up in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as became evident after the war.

[Pavkovic] Croats and Muslims have different visions of the structure of the Federation.

[Rajic] The HDZ and the Croat people have discussed the project of the Federation very soberly, with both criticism and respect for the political reality. We accepted the Federation as a historical necessity in the relations between us and the Muslims, and we made it clear that such a Federation was our political goal. Our partners considered the Federation to be a way to reach their other goals, and that has not changed. Naturally, we also have an additional goal in the Federation, which is to solve the problem of Croats in the Serb Republic. The crucial difference is that our principle is the one of equal rights of nations in a complex state, and our partner's principle is the equality in a unitarian state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, politics has never been determined by wishes, and we will have to adjust our requests to the present and future reality. We are surely doing a righteous thing.

[Pavkovic] To what extent have the legal capacities been transferred from the Republic to the Federation?

[Rajic] The Muslim political leadership has used every legal and semilegal opportunity to reinforce the functions of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and make the Federation its subordinate entity. The culmination of their attitude toward the Federation has been their unconstitutional act of forming the Agency for Investigation and Documentation. The structure of the Agency has made it a power above the society. It is almost entirely mononational, and it has obstructed the work of the Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs. I could describe many cases in which the capacity of the institutions of the Republic was extended at the expense of the corresponding Federal institutions. Nevertheless, an end to that will come quite soon—after the elections, when the Republic is terminated and the Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina established. Therefore, I do not have to waste my breath on those efforts on the part of our partners.

[Pavkovic] Has the cooperation between the HDZ and the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] been satisfactory?

[Rajic] The cooperation with the SDA does not meet our requirements, nor the dynamics of the political and other events in the Federation and the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina. We could improve our communication and cooperation—moreover, we must. Cooperation will become even more indispensable than it has been. My letter to the president of the SDA, Mr. Izetbegovic, has been answered. We will meet in Sarajevo on 14 August and begin the discussion about many issues of vital importance for our two nations and other citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Pavkovic] The transfer of the HDZ leadership from Mostar to Sarajevo is much more than a technical matter. Do you have the prerequisite conditions for that?

[Rajic] We wanted to move the headquarters of our party to Sarajevo in February, but the SDA did not take any actions to remove the Ministry of Town Planning and Environment of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina from our premises. We discussed that on a number of occasions. We also wrote requests and informed the representatives of the international community that we were not allowed to return to our prewar premises in Sarajevo. Nothing has changed, though. We are hoping to solve that problem through negotiations with the SDA. We must be enabled to live and work in Sarajevo in order to be in the heart of the political, parliamentary, economic, and other processes. We are not the only ones that need our presence in Sarajevo, where all the international institutions and diplomats are.

[Box, p 10]

Union of Croats

[Pavkovic] You have been reelected president. What will be your priorities?

[Rajic] I think it is a great honor to be reelected president of the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also a great responsibility. The universal opinion is that members of our Presidency are capable of conducting a successful central policy of the HDZ. In my opinion, my closest associates are excellent from the political, moral, and professional point of view. I have accepted this challenge, although I am aware of its complicated nature, because I have a strong belief in the power of this party and the entire Croat nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I highlighted the most important principles of our politics in my closing speech at the assembly. On that occasion I said that peace was our choice, and that might become our slogan for the elections. I will do my best to direct all the efforts of our party toward the lasting peace and equality of Croats with the other nations, as specified in the principles of the Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina. Within our party, I will espouse the maximum democratic freedom and initiative in suggestions and discussions, as well as a firm hierarchy in the realization of our decisions. We will remain faithful to our basic guidelines in appointments, which implies a union of Croats in space, experience, and generations.

[Box, p 11]

[Pavkovic] The HDZ has often been said to be divided in a number of factions. Is that a vicious rumor or an information coming from a well-informed source?

[Rajic] Political speculations are an ordinary thing here nowadays. People are envious, and you know that. The HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina has been analyzed and quasi-analyzed many times. There have been speculations, presumptions, valuations, and estimations. That is not surprising, if you bear in mind that the HDZ has had an almost unison support of the Croat nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which has given us almost all the power. That reduced the opportunities for the political groups and individuals who are looking for political power in lobbies or media speculations instead of through elections. That is the best explanation for the incessant allegations of our schisms, decreasing popularity, vanishing political power, etc. Movement-parties appear in the political life under special historical circumstances. Such parties have tremendous number of members and supporters, and it is not surprising for such a party to comprise individuals or groups with quite different political views of the past, the future, and the present. That does not impair the party. That is an advantage. Had our views and ideas been fewer, we would have been accused of being undemocratic or having a one-track mind. Those who criticize us had better defeat us in the elections. They know that they cannot defeat us, so they will have to settle for predicting our fall.

[Box, p 11]

The Termination of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia

[Pavkovic] The Muslim partners have recently embarked on a vehement campaign for the termination of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia. What plans for the future of the Bosnian Croats does the Croat political leadership have?

[Rajic] You are right, the Muslims have recently been an opponent rather than a partner. Their campaign has really been fierce, and some of their requests hurt the dignity of the Bosnian Croats. That shows their political shortsightedness, which will in the long run be a hindrance for a proper partnership—a crucial requirement for the peace process and the Federation. They are making things difficult for themselves, too, by asking for an instant termination of all functions of the Croat Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is easy to say: "Let us terminate the authorities of Herzeg-Bosnia," but it is quite difficult to say which institutions will take over their tasks and how. For instance, who will provide for 140,000 salaries and other incomes, who will take care of the security and judiciary system, education, health

care, social security, and retirement pensions? If our partners and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina can give us good answers to this and similar questions, the problem of Herzeg-Bosnia will become purely technical. However, if they are not capable of doing that, the termination of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia will be a very risky political step. Basically, we are willing to continue the negotiations about the further transfer of power from Herzeg-Bosnia to the Federal authorities, provided that the latter are established and put in function. Such is our political decision that was confirmed in our Fourth Assembly. However, both the Dayton agreement and the international community requested that the duties of the authorities of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina be transferred to the Federation, too. The intention behind the neglect of this parallel process—in which the two legal systems are melting into the third, the Federation—is to frustrate the Bosnian Croats and hide the truth from the Bosnian Muslims. That attitude might bring about some momentary advantages, especially in the preelection period, but it will surely bounce back. Our partners should finally tell their nation that the functions of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, just like the functions of the Croat Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, must melt into the functions of the Federation. Anyway, the elections will come soon, Bosnia-Herzegovina will be constituted according to the Dayton plan, and all the lies about the present situation will have to be replaced by the truth.

B-H: Stolac Mayor Discusses Local Situation

AU1508175796 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE
(European edition) in Serbo-Croatian 12 Aug 96 p 6

[Interview with Mehmed Dizdar, chairman of the Presidency of Stolac Municipality, by Deno Novo in Mostar; date not given: "We Shall Return for Justice"]

[FBIS Translated Text] I met Mehmed Dizdar, the mayor of Stolac, approximately 50 km from the town where he was born, in the improvised office of the Stolac municipal authorities in Mostar. The first question was whether he—despite everything—still believed in the future of Stolac.

[Dizdar] If I did not believe, I would not be doing the things I am doing; I have a hard job in which I am confronted with numerous problems, difficulties, and humiliation. I believe, however, that Stolac will be Stolac again.

[Novo] Since more than three years have passed since the purge of Bosniaks from Stolac, are you not afraid that the population of Stolac might have already found a place to live, that they have simply given up their return?

[Dizdar] In every exodus like this one, there is a number of people who never return, and it can be taken for granted that a certain number of the former Stolac population will never return. If a return is possible, however, the number of people to return will be large, since the population of Stolac likes its town. These people are something special, people with extreme homesickness. Homesickness will not be the only reason for our return, however, we will also return for justice, for which we now fight.

[Novo] How many Bosniaks remained (were allowed to stay) in Stolac?

[Dizdar] The complete population of Stolac was expelled. Out of 8,100 Bosniaks who lived there before the war, only 16 remained.

[Novo] Of how many do you know the current locations?

[Dizdar] Around 5,300 live in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Regarding others, we can also claim: to be able to trace them. I think we will have difficulty only reaching those who live in America.

[Novo] How many times have you been to Stolac since the so-called freedom of movement was established?

[Dizdar] I have been there approximately 10 times. I had some meetings, so I visited Stolac on the way there. After my first visit I was sick, I could neither eat nor sleep for two days, since Stolac is so destroyed that it is inconceivable for the human mind. Eighty percent of all houses were torn down. The Croats who live there now say that Serbs did that, which is a pure lie. These houses were destroyed during the time Bosniaks were being expelled, and later with the aim of destroying the Bosniak spirit in Stolac.

Plans in Reserve

[Novo] What can you say about the Croatian population of Stolac that has always lived there?

[Dizdar] First of all, I have to point out that there lived 6,100 Croats in the commune of Stolac, and in the town itself there lived somewhat more than 6,000, who settled down here after the World War II. Fifty years ago there were only nine Croatian families in Stolac. These people are still in Stolac, but a majority has plans for a possible departure in reserve.

[Novo] Has the official Croatian politics succeeded in bringing refugees from other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina to Stolac?

[Dizdar] They have partially succeeded, but these people are Croats who do not have any choice and a majority of

them is trying to find some other solution. These people feel that Stolac does not belong to them. It is horrible and incomprehensible that politics can force the people to live in a place in which they do not want to live and where they do not belong, this is "raping" of people.

[Novo] Has a single Bosniak family returned to Stolac?

[Dizdar] It has not been registered that a single Bosniak spent a night in Stolac, nor that he has come during the day, except for visits organized by the UNHCR [United Nations High Commission for Refugees] or other international organizations. It also happens that a Croat takes his Bosniak friend to town.

[Novo] Can you assume what would happen if someone simply took his car and drove to Stolac?

[Dizdar] Two inhabitants of Stolac tried to enter Stolac in that way. The first one came from Bitulja and when he reached Stolac he was arrested and, after being interviewed at the police station, he was returned to the control point in the vicinity of Mostar. The other one, Amir Skando, is registered as missing, we assume that he was tortured and killed.

A Parallel

[Novo] As one of the obligatory excuses for this policy Croats quote the example of Bugojno. Can a parallel be drawn between Bugojno and Stolac, since they are dominated now by two different nationalities?

[Dizdar] Absolutely not. Some 3,000 Croats live in Bugojno. Within the pilot project now effective in Bugojno a certain number of Croatian families returned to town, and there is freedom of movement there, which is not true of Stolac. I would like to appeal to our authorities in Bugojno, Vares, Konjic, and Jablanica to open their towns for Croats. This is not the problem, however, the problem is that Croatian authorities do not allow Croats to return, although they want to. I spoke to these refugees and we get along exceptionally well, we have the same aims and the same problems.

[Novo] In the end I would like to mention the name of the greatest citizen of Stolac, the poet Mehmedalija Mak Dizdar. Can you comment on the extremely bizarre circumstance that a policy (the one with the headquarters in Zagreb) can celebrate the 25th anniversary of the death of the "Croatian" poet, banishing at the same time his descendants from Stolac? It has to be admitted too that Bosniak culture leaders behave as if they were ignorant of the biggest Bosniak poet.

[Dizdar] I think that the situation with Mak Dizdar cannot be tolerated, he has to be given the position he deserves. There are people in Bosnia who think that the history of Bosnia started with the arrival of the Turks.

Bosnia's history began much earlier, however, and Mak is a representative of that Bosnia. If Mak knew that he was claimed by the Croats, after the things they did to his home town, he would turn in the grave. Ten times.

B-H: Izetbegovic Denounces Harassment of Opposition Politicians

LD1508164796 Sarajevo Radio Hajat
in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 15 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, made the following statement in connection with recent incidents in Gradacac and Kalesija:

Upon my return from the trip [to Geneva], I learned from the press about the trouble caused to Messrs. Kljucic and Komsic during recent election rallies [by United List for Bosnia] in Gradacac and Kalesija. I express my profound disapproval with and regret about this, and my message to everyone, irrespective of who they are, is not to use my name when they cause similar incidents. I fought for a Bosnia in which people would be able to think and speak out freely. I am unhappy when I see that some individuals resort to shouting and using poles instead of arguments, because—regardless of what their motives are for doing so—they help the enemies of Bosnia by doing it. I know very well both Kljucic and Komsic, as well as their activity during both war and peace. Regardless of our different political stances, in my eyes they have been and still are honorable and respectful people.

B-H: Opposition Supporters Attacked in Northern Bosnia

AU1608105896 Paris AFP in English
1034 GMT 16 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Aug 16 (AFP)—Opposition party supporters in a Moslem-controlled town in northern Bosnia were attacked in three separate incidents Thursday, a UN official said here Friday.

With less than a month to go before Bosnia-Herzegovina votes for the first time since war broke out in 1992, UN police were told of "three cases of serious intimidation of people belonging to opposition parties," UN spokesman Alexander Ivanko said.

In one case, an "explosive device" was put in front of a house belonging to a person who is a member of an opposition party, he said.

In another case, a hand grenade was thrown at the home of a Moslem, who belongs to a "pro-opposition party." "This person stated that he did not trust the local police and did not believe they would conduct a fair

investigation since previously he has been harassed by the local police," Ivanko said.

In a third incident, an explosion occurred near the residence of a Moslem who is believed to be a supporter of Moslem rebel Fikret Abdic, the UN official added.

Ivanko said the incidents were "very worrying" and added "the federation police should try to do their utmost to ensure that political harassment of opposition parties ceases immediately."

Cazin, in northwest Bosnia, close to the town of Bihac, was the site of an attack earlier this year on former prime minister Haris Silajdzic.

B-H: Independent TV Suggests Rift Imminent in Opposition Bloc

AU1508131196 Sarajevo NTV99 Television in Serbo-Croatian 0730 GMT 15 Aug 96

[From the "Oko 22" program—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Studio announcer] Is a rift among opposition parties imminent after the joint statement by nine parties on the conditions for the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina? This is the subject of our next report.

[Unidentified correspondent] The Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina: We are talking to Mr. Mustafa Pamuk. Why was the joint news conference of all the signatories to the statement not held on Monday [12 August]?

[Pamuk] At the meeting there was the idea to organize a joint news conference by all the participants in the meeting. However, just before the end of the meeting, due to other obligations of the party leaders and other leading officials, we could not agree on the time for this news conference, and we simply decided that each political party should have its own regular election news conference on Monday or Tuesday.

[Correspondent] Mr. Pamuk, how easy is it to reach an agreement among the representatives of the nine opposition parties?

[Pamuk] When it comes to the issue of the integrity and survival of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is not an issue at all as far as the opposition parties are concerned. As for other issues, there are of course some differences among us, differences that are not so great that they cannot be overcome, on which we cannot agree.

[Correspondent] We discussed this same issue with Stanko Sliskovic, chairman of the Croatian Peasants' Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Sliskovic] These nine political parties represent the Joint List, five and four other parties that discussed the

problems connected to the conditions for the democratic and fair elections in September. [sentence as heard] I do not think it was unusual to have reviewed the general situation.

[Correspondent] Were there any differences of opinion?

[Sliskovic] That is quite normal since the political concepts of each of the parties are different, and that is why they go by different names. [passage omitted]

B-H: Quarter of Bosnian Refugees in Montenegro Register To Vote

AU1308154396 Sarajevo ONASA in English 13 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Podgorica, Montenegro, 12 August (ONASA)—Of 13,500 displaced persons who currently live in Montenegro and are eligible to vote in Bosnia's elections, only 2,934 have registered for the elections, the Montenegrin MONTENA news agency reported.

Of the total displaced people in Montenegro, 2,099 expressed a wish to vote in some of the Bosnian towns. Transportation between Montenegro and Bosnia will be procured to enable them to vote in person. The remaining 825 refugees want to fulfill their civil rights and vote at polling stations in Montenegro. Those who are willing to vote in Montenegrin towns will receive final instructions regarding the elections at the end of August. For those returning to Bosnia, transportation will be organized on election day to the places the voters chose to be their electoral units. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe will supervise these arrangements.

B-H: Zagreb Introduces B-H Decals for Herzeg-Bosnia Vehicles

AU1608105096 Sarajevo IMAGE in Serbo-Croatian 15 Aug 96 p 3

[Article by M.A.: "Vehicles From Herzeg-Bosnia Cannot Enter Croatia If They Do Not Have a Bosnia-Herzegovina Sticker"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The border crossings between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia have recently become more crowded. The reason for this is not an increasing number of Bosnians heading for the coast, but Croatian customs officials. Namely, following the West's great pressure on Croatia, Zagreb has decided that vehicles from the so-called Herzeg-Bosnia must display a Bosnia-Herzegovina sticker as a symbol of the state to which they belong. All the complaints from Herzeg-Bosnia were to no avail, so it is no longer surprising

to see vehicles from Grude or Capljina with Bosnia-Herzegovina stickers. This is yet more evidence that when Zagreb wants something, it has the power to implement it. Along with the Bosnia-Herzegovina passport, the car sticker will now serve to remind Herzegovinians to which country they belong.

B-H: World Bank Gives Credits for Agricultural Development

AU0708083096 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian)
in Serbo-Croatian 22 Jul 96 p 6

[Article by N. Banjanovic: "Credits for 7,000 Farmers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Negotiations on the purchase of machines for agricultural production and cattle have started, in accordance with the special project "Emergency Reconstruction of Farms in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina," which manages investments worth \$50.4 million. Plans are for cattle to be imported by September and machines by the end of the year. Certain changes and additions to the project have recently been made, so that now virtually everything has been agreed upon. The Office for the Implementation of Projects in Agriculture in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is very active, has been working to ensure that.

Most [Funding] for Machines

"In accordance with the project 'Emergency Reconstruction for Farms,' a total of \$38 million has been provided up to this point, and many works agreed upon," says Zahid Causevic, director of the Office for the Implementation of Projects in Agriculture in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Activities are—for the most part—carried out by the World Bank, but also by governments of some friendly countries, the European Commission, and others.

Most [means] will be invested in the purchase of agricultural machines—\$27.6 million worth; out that, \$20 million are credits from the organization IDA [International Development Association]. Since most agricultural production and activities rely on machines, this allocation proportion is good.

Zahid Causevic further indicated that eight packages of machines will be imported: three packages of cultivators (5-7 kw, 7-9 kw, and 10 kw), three packages of tractors (18-26 kw and 27-37 kw), with two tires and with four tires. A package of trailers for tractors, and another for combine harvesters, will also be imported.

Thus, there are plans to import 3,240 cultivators; 450 tractors; 695 trailers; and 14 combine harvesters.

There are separate plans to acquire 11,421 trailers for cultivators and 1,230 trailers for tractors.

The Import of Sheep Has Been Left Out

The decision to purchase 3,456 calves was also made, the majority of which would be of the "simental" ["simentalska"] type. In addition, 2,660 goats of the Alpine and "Sanska" ["alpske i sanske pasmine"] sort will be purchased bringing the total value to \$7.3 million.

Originally, the plan was to purchase a certain number of sheep, but because of the high import costs their purchase was put off, and it was decided instead to purchase more calves.

"It is my opinion," Zahid Causevic points out, "that we should get sheep with coarse wool from the neighboring countries, which would be economically acceptable for our households."

The negotiations about the number of cattle to be allotted to individual households lasted a long time. Since funding from IFADA [expansion unknown] is used to pay for the import of cattle, their representatives requested that each household receive a maximum of two calves and 20 goats.

"We who work in the office for implementation," Zahid Causevic said, "believe that each household should receive a maximum of one calf and 10 goats, since this program is only to ensure the survival of the population. Later, different criteria can be established."

Various credits can be given to around 7,000 households, which can meet the determined criteria.

The value of individual machines and of cattle will be determined after the contracts are concluded, machines supplied, and cattle imported. Maintenance expenses will also be determined.

Credits Should Be Paid Back

What requirements should a farmer meet in order to get credit from the World Bank or others for the stimulation of agricultural development?

In the Office for the Implementation of Projects, they have a ready answer for this: A census was conducted throughout the territory of the federation to register all households, and based on the adopted criteria, each household will be allotted agricultural machines and cattle, in accordance with the project "Emergency Reconstruction of Farms in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

The chosen households must meet the several requirements. They have to be situated in dangerous areas,

which suffered big war damages. Those damages in agriculture must total more than 50 percent of the value of agricultural machines or cattle.

The households [families] should also comprise persons who are considered refugees or displaced persons, who have come back to their land.

The future users of the money must have proof of ownership of their land. They must accept the responsibility to pay back the credit and also commit themselves to producing for the market.

Households that apply to purchase tractors should possess at least a hectare of arable land on their property, and the lot for cultivation secured on the basis of contracts or of associations with their neighbors, for the purpose of agricultural development [sentence as published].

Households that wish to get cattle must also have at least a hectare of arable land so that food is available for the cows or goats.

The final allocation and selection of producers according to the established criteria will be carried out by municipal organs.

B-H: Serb Vice President Biljana Plavsic Profiled
96BA0367B Belgrade INTERVJU in Serbo-Croatian
31 May-14 Jun 96 pp 24-25

[Article by Snezana Rakocevic-Novakovic: "Portrait of a Lady: The Serb Woman Will Not Bend"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *What did Radovan Karadzic have in mind when he gave responsibility for relations with the "international community" to Biljana Plavsic, who has constantly raised the pressure on that "international community" in recent years?*

Fighters on the front lines, whom she frequently visited, unlike other top officials of the Serb Republic, call her "the Serb empress." Bishop Amfilohije Radovic says that she is "a new Kosovo girl." The world press has lately been unambiguous in its assessment that she is an ultranationalist. After she refused to shake hands with President Milosevic in Pale because she was insulted by his offer to sign the Vance-Owen plan, he called her a "nut case"; the Muslims have long included her at the top of their private list of war criminals; and Carl Bildt's spokesman Kolom Marfi responds that she is "an extreme ultranationalist, but she has not been charged with war crimes, and those who think that she should be should send their files to the appropriate place." Quoting some of the world media, Carl Bildt, who is not thrilled with Karadzic's replacement, called her "the Serb iron lady." Those who want to insult her most say that she is

a "professional Serb." "Subconscious internationalists" in the Serb Republic even call her La Passionaria!

New Semipresident

I believe you recognize her. Biljana Plavsic, the former vice president and new semipresident of the Serb Republic. Yes, semipresident. That is not a typographical error. Because by pulling this lady from his sleeve, like—in his estimation—a trump ace, in the 11th hour, Karadzic offered her half of his presidential seat in a gentlemanly fashion, no matter how that move is interpreted. Biljana will make herself at home there. No place is too cramped for her determination and exclusiveness as far as the nation is concerned. Her problem is not that she does not know how to sit on half a seat, but rather that she does not know how to sit on two of them at once. But that ability—to play both sides—is the absolute minimum requirement for diplomacy and international contacts. However, Biljana Plavsic's diplomatic methodology is tactless, to put it in the mildest possible terms, and her frankness is often insulting and unnerving. It is true that with her you always know where you stand, because that which Koljevic, Krajisnik, Buha, and others whisper she says flat out. A good quality, but a quagmire in diplomacy. And that is precisely the job that Karadzic gave his iron lady: She will speak on his behalf with those people known as the "international community."

Judging from her previous contacts with Muslims and Croats, Biljana is completely ill-suited for diplomacy, primarily because of her "insulting frankness," but unfortunately, given the impression that the Serbs from Bosnia have made on the international community over the past four years, there is nothing at all left for Biljana Plavsic to foul up. Except that some zealous international negotiator could feel sorry for Radovan Karadzic after meeting up with Ms. Plavsic.

Still, with women one never knows where one stands, but Biljana Plavsic is certainly not one of those "bearded ladies" of politics, with a excess of male hormones, to which we are accustomed, especially from the former system. Although it is not polite to peek at ladies' birth certificates, Biljana Plavsic carries her rather long years extremely well, always composed, elegant, warm in personal contacts, vulnerable....

She was born in Tuzla in 1930 and grew up in Sarajevo in the family of a doctor of biology. She too reached the pinnacle of education in that field. After completing graduate school in Zagreb, she began her academic career upon returning to Sarajevo, at the then Natural-Mathematic Faculty, where she progressed from assistant to professor to dean of that faculty. She stayed

at the Primat, as Sarajevans called that institution, where Prof. Dr. Biljana Plavsic was in fact well-respected, until March 1992. Twenty years earlier (in 1970), she was awarded a Fulbright Scholarship and spent 14 months in the now-detested United States.

She emphasizes that she was never a "progressive Tito youth, even though it was hard not to be that during the general communist fervor." She says that she inherited her opposition to communism and her enormous love for her own nation from her father. During that war, most of her family was driven into camps, and from there fled to Serbia. They did not touch her father, a biologist with a doctorate from Vienna who was completely devoted to science.

"We were happy about liberation, but our joy was short-lived. Broz came to Sarajevo and a big rally was held. 'Down with hegemonistic Serbs!' 'Hang King Pera!' Those were the most common slogans that were shouted. No one even timidly uttered the words 'Down with the ustasas!' When we got home, my father told my brother and me, 'Children, that was the first and the last rally that I have ever attended. You decide for yourselves.' That has always remained etched in my memory. To this day, I have remained faithful to the notion, which took shape early on, that 'anyone who betrays his parents, his class, his nation, will not fare well in life,'" Plavsic often says.

She is convinced that war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was unavoidable, that "that was the only way for Serbs not to live under Turks." The national interest mandated that she become seriously involved in politics, which she did not seriously pursue until the early 1990's, when Dr. Nikola Koljevic invited her to join the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS]. Or at least she did not pursue it in the League of Communists, of which she was never a member, but her voice could be heard in the former organization of the Socialist Alliance. I remember the determination with which she, in what could be called a lonely position, stood up in the overcrowded meeting hall of the Republican Conference of the SSRN BiH [Socialist Alliance of Working People of Bosnia-Herzegovina] to defend Prof. Dr. Nenad Kecmanovic, who was under a barrage of attacks from all sides and all levels for his "espionage activity" and "bad security culture." Her lonely and sincere, albeit often clumsy defense of her university colleague was a type of courage at that time, because defending an "enemy" meant bringing total discreditation upon oneself—something that Plavsic did not shun.

How Biljana Plavsic Went to the Mountains

After joining the SDS and after the 1990 elections, she became a member of the collective Presidency

of Bosnia-Herzegovina and chairman of the Council for the Protection of Constitutional Order of Bosnia-Herzegovina. She was often in despair in that position because while she held it the Muslims were distributing large quantities of arms in all directions and she was powerless to do anything because the functions of both the parliament and the presidency were thwarted. In early April 1992, Biljana Plavsic and Dr. Nikola Koljevic left the joint Bosnian presidency and began living in the mountains above Sarajevo. She was the last of the inner leadership circle to arrive in Pale because she remained (bravely) in Sarajevo the longest. Strict with herself most of all, she lived in a small hotel room in Pale, with all of her belongings in two suitcases. "I could have lived in a villa selected for me instead of a hotel room. But with the situation as it was, I would not have been comfortable in a villa." Those who know Biljana Plavsic well say that she has a right to demand moral purity of everyone because she herself lives a meager existence, more for others than for herself. She has no connection with the "golfers," nor with the aluminum affairs, nor with petroleum, but she would not have signed on to Lisbon, or Brussels, or Dayton, or Paris.... Thus, the following could be said: "Radovan is defying the international community, which is cleaner but firmer than he is." Plavsic will follow him more than he follows himself. Radovan has given her a job in which one can only give in or break down. It is hard to say what Biljana Plavsic will do, but judging from her political credo: "Neither kneel nor lie down, because whoever kneels is also going to lie down"—she is not going to break down.

Who? Who knows that?

So here she is, Biljana Plavsic, the first lady of the Serb Republic. A lady who has emerged from the background, although according to the hierarchy that person should be from the highest level. But she is not. Far from high-level politics, although from her job description, as vice president of the Serb Republic, she was certain to move through high political waters, for unknown reasons she moved primarily in humanitarian waters, on the levels of the Circle of Serbian Nurses, touring the trenches, attending mass funerals, visiting burned-out villages.... As a monarchist by orientation, she strived to maintain the best possible relations with the Crown, and because of her intense association with Prince Tomislav wags called her "Princess." She was frequently a guest at church ceremonies and services. She believes in God and says that "when her strength gives out she finds security and calm in the church."

Holbrooke, Redman, Stoltenberg... and many other international negotiators have not had the opportunity to meet her, even though she is the one designated by the

Assembly of the Serb Republic for contacts with international representatives, and has been for some time.... Who knows why, but she has never attended negotiations abroad. But if his predecessors did not meet her, now that the lady has emerged from the background Carl Bildt will have the opportunity to get to know her better. "I will be an iron lady in negotiations with the international community and I will seek observance of every letter of the Dayton Agreement," she informed Bildt, about whom the Western media note that "Karadzic, a famous poker player, has bluffed him once again, offering him the queen from his political deck, gambling with his personal and political survival."

"I do not trust anyone in this game," Carl Bildt stated on 20 May.

Thus, he trusts neither Karadzic nor his "alter ego," as the Italian press describes Biljana Plavsic.

But does Dr. Karadzic trust his own "alter ego"?

Without reservation. Ever since the war began, she has not changed her opinion in relation to daily policy. She says that she regards herself as a "Serb nationalist in the most positive sense of the word."

"Only if you are nationally aware," says Plavsic, "are you in a position to understand the national aspirations of other nations. There is no absolutely need to exercise control over me."

Numerous armored vehicles in the Serb Republic have borne her name. "Several days ago in Zvornik, I was walking past a wonderful bar when the owner, who had been an exceptional fighter on our side, called out to me and said, 'Look at what it says up there.' I looked, and above the door was inscribed 'Goddess Biljana.'"

Karadzic and Mladic—Unruly Children

For some a goddess, for others "the personification of Pale's dirty nationalistic policy, whose statements make your hair stand on end," as the people in the Civil Alliance of Serbia would say. Sometimes her statements are indeed dangerous and cruel, like when she said that "if necessary let six million Serbs perish so that the other six million can live in freedom." Many will also not forgive her for her assertion that "ethnic cleansing is a natural process which has only now been classified as a war crime." She has never issued retractions for such statements. However, she does say that she never called Mladic and Karadzic "infantile children with a mischievous sense of vanity," but she did say that she has been the scotch tape holding things together whenever they have burst.

What else do we remember her for? We recall her trip to the village of Sijekovac, the precursor to the war

drama. With then-member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, Croat Franjo Boras, she was the first to arrive at the scene of the crime, as a witness to the horrors that would shortly thereafter develop into a major and bloody civil war. She was also the first to arrive in Bijeljina with Fikret Abdic. With Abdic looking on, she showered Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan with (nationally) passionate kisses in honor of the liberation of Bijeljina from the Muslims?!...

Knowing what will upset her most of all, those who have attempted to "get her goat" for one reason or another have used various methods. Like the mayor of Knin (whom Plavsic did not spare from criticism), Drago Kovacevic, who wondered "how is it possible for a Serb like Plavsic to be married to a Turk"!

"Good heavens!" Biljana said in her own defense. "I have been married to a Serb, Krajisnik, a respected attorney in Sarajevo. Drago Kovacevic was stung by my speech before the Assembly in Knin, so now he is sitting around making things up...."

Not that long ago, Dr. Plavsic was asked when she would come to Serbia knowing that she is on the list of 130 people who are denied entry "in keeping with the imposed sanctions on the Drina."

"I could come right now," she responded. "People call me up, guaranteeing me passage, but since I am vice president of the Serb Republic I cannot do it that way, as an illegal. I will come to Serbia, God willing, when something changes in the minds of certain people."

Nothing changed in the minds of "these" or of "those" people, but Biljana Plavsic arrived in Belgrade. The news reports said: "The vice presidents of the Serb Republic, Dr. Biljana Plavsic and Dr. Nikola Koljevic, met with President Milosevic." The meeting was cordial.

There is hope for negotiator Bildt: Perhaps he can achieve something with Biljana Plavsic. She is not really that unyielding. It is not true that she never changes. Everything is subject to change, even the "Serb iron lady." Or, she has simply gotten the better of the first hours of diplomacy. Madame semipresident. Half Biljana, half Radovan. What is that compared to the Serb nation, which still wants to join "Jewrope"?

B-H: Klckovic Fails To Show Up for Talks on Prisoners

AU1508172496 Paris AFP in English
1655 GMT 15 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Aug 15 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb Prime Minister Gojko Klckovic failed to show up Thursday for talks on the release of prisoners

and exhumations of war dead, an international official said here.

Klickovic "failed to show" for the talks scheduled in Sarajevo Thursday evening with the Bosnian Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic, a Moslem, and the Croat President of the Moslem-Croat Federation, Kresimir Zubak, said Duncan Bullivant, spokesman for international envoy Carl Bildt.

Bildt's deputy Michael Steiner is expected to make a statement on the issue to reporters Friday.

The Bosnian Serbs recently ordered a ban on the locally-organised exhumations of war dead in their territory claiming that Moslem and Croat authorities were preventing them from exhuming the remains of Serbs killed during the Bosnian war.

They demanded that Bildt organise the meeting to which Klickovic failed to turn up.

Exhumations organised by the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia have not been affected by the Serb ban.

B-H: Commentary Examines IFOR's Recent 'Tough Stance'

*AU1508113796 Sarajevo DNEVNI AVAZ
in Serbo-Croatian 14 Aug 96 p 3*

[Unattributed commentary: "Fear Naught"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There are several significant aspects to last Monday's visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina by high-ranking NATO officials Javier Solana and George Joulwan, and some analysts believe that following the talks in Pale, many factors in the implementation of the Dayton agreement could and should be different.

Three things became clear in Brussels, all of which require efficient action: first, war options are still active in the Serb Republic [RS] and Herzeg-Bosnia; second, subsiding tension resulted in IFOR turning into UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force], despite the wide scope of its authority; and third, it is necessary to create a favorable military situation for the 14 September elections.

The feeling is that since the peace process has been seriously threatened, NATO will have IFOR take some tough actions, not only to confirm its presence but to confirm its decisiveness in the region. Operation "Fear Naught," launched on 12 August, should be interpreted in this light, as should IFOR's heightened state of alert. Although the operation is now being conducted as a ground force maneuver, it is clear that some aspects of it are much more important.

It is not only about the inspection of the controversial munitions depot at the Han Pijesak barracks. After some "friendly persuasion," Biljana Plavsic joined General Michael Walker on Tuesday and personally attended the inspection of the arsenal.

IFOR's heightened activity in the RS, perhaps even a demonstration of force, is calculated to encourage the forces of peace and warn those who are still in the mood for war.

It seems that Brussels has realized that IFOR's withdrawal from even a single assignment would mean its defeat in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the end result of which would be the end of the peace agreement. That is why IFOR's inspection of the Han Pijesak barracks is much more than a regular inspection; it is a question of reputation and standing in Europe and around the world.

It is clear that IFOR wants to demonstrate a tough stance in the remaining four months of its mandate and to give those who do not want peace the impression that IFOR will be around for a long time rather than that they will be leaving tomorrow and creating an immense void. This is even more important in light of the fact that the opponents of Dayton obviously want an "UNPROFOR-like" rerun and are taking advantage of IFOR's every indecisive action.

B-H: RS Ministry Bans FERN Broadcasts in Banja Luka Area

*AU1408142496 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian)
in Serbo-Croatian 14 Aug 96 p 9*

[Article by Bo.R.: "Radio FERN Banned"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Serb Republic [RS] Traffic and Communications Ministry on Tuesday informed the Free Elections Radio Network [FERN] and relevant OSCE offices in Sarajevo that on 12 August they had passed a decision to ban the work of this radio station in the RS, that is, that they withheld approval for transmitting via the Lisina relay (Mt. Kozara) near Banja Luka and the 103.1 FM frequency.

The accompanying explanation states that "an inspection revealed that a program was being broadcast via the Lisina relay although the Traffic and Communications Ministry had not been issued a license pursuant to Article 68 of the Law on Communication Systems (Official Gazette of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, No. 15/90)." The RS ministry statement adds that this is the reason for banning broadcasts on this frequency until the necessary license is obtained.

Republican inspector Andjelko Trkulja informed FERN and OSCE that they could not appeal the decision, but

that they could file an administrative suit with the RS Supreme Court.

FERN radio started elections broadcasts on 15 July of this year, after obtaining the necessary licenses from the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government and Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic. In addition to correspondents from the Federation, the radio also employed three correspondents from the RS, one in Pale and two in Banja Luka. This ensured balanced and quality coverage of political party presentations and timely reporting on election and other activities in the RS.

The decision to ban broadcasts via the Lisina relay near Banja Luka has come at a time when the FERN management is negotiating with IFOR about the use of their relays, which would ensure better reception in the eastern part of the RS, and when a growing number of people are opting for these programs, which are increasingly popular among citizens who want objective and timely information. Whether this decision was made on the spur of the moment or whether its nature is political remains a mystery at this point, but it is clear that the Pale leadership does not want its citizens listening to a program that devotes equal attention to developments in the Federation and the RS.

B-H: OSCE Penalizes SDS for Violating Election Rules

AU1508202796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 15 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Appellation Subcommittee has adopted two decisions penalizing the Serb Democratic Party [SDS] for forcing the refugees in the Serb Republic to vote in the municipalities in which they currently live. This was stated by OSCE Sarajevo spokeswoman Joanna van Vliet at a news conference today.

In the first case, the SDS from Doboj advised the town assembly to make humanitarian aid dependent

on the registration of refugees to vote for the new municipalities in the places in which they live. The subcommission has found this to be in contravention of the election rules, Vliet said. The subcommission has decided that the SDS must pay a \$25,000 fine, which represents 25 percent of [words indistinct] for both sides for elections, and to publicly apologize to the commission in writing. If this is not done within four days after the pronouncement of the ruling, every day after the expiration of the deadline, two SDS candidates for the municipal elections in Doboj will be taken off the election list and will not be allowed to run for a public post, she said, adding that if the SDS does not show the intention of sending a public apology to the victims of such a practice, a total of 30 of its candidates will be taken off the municipal election list.

In the second case, in Modrica, 59 people complained to OSCE that they were not given the choice of voting in absentia or voting in municipalities different from the one they are currently living in. Van Vliet said that the local election commission, without any consultations with the refugees in the Modrica municipality, filled in their forms for voting.

In this case it has been decided that all 59 people can vote in absentia and that Vidan Radulovic, chairman of the local election commission in Modrica be replaced for violating the election rules, the OSCE spokeswoman said. She stressed that because of such cases the temporary election commission will consider making it possible, without any special procedure, to vote in the municipalities in which they lived in 1991. In that case the refugees will simply be able to show up on the election day in their own municipality and vote there, regardless of which form they had previously filled in, the OSCE spokeswoman said.

Croatia: ICRC Official on 'Alarming' Condition of Krajina Serbs

LD1508130996 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1257 GMT 15 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Aug. 15 (TANJUG)—The living conditions of the remaining Serbs in Krajina are alarming, a spokesperson for the Belgrade office of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) told the Novi Sad daily DNEVNIK on Thursday.

Francis Ourtoobis, a Canadian, said she feared for their lives because of the coming winter.

About 10,000 mostly elderly and frail persons live in remote villages throughout Krajina and their only hope and help is the ICRC, she said.

Ourtoobis was speaking about the few Serbs who remained in Krajina last summer when the Croatian Army overran the region and banished more than 300,000 Serbs from their ancestral lands.

There is much reason for concern, Ourtoobis said. These are all old and sick people who have no means of transportation or communication on their remote farms.

She said these people had survived since last August only thanks to the mobility of ICRC staff. Those were their only contacts with the outside world, she said.

We learn directly from these people about the robberies, torchings and torture to which they are subjected, but, unfortunately, we are unable to protect them, Ourtoobis said.

Their situation is indeed hopeless under these conditions, the ICRC spokesperson said. The Croatian authorities have not done anything yet to help them, although ICRC officials constantly keep sending demands to that effect to Zagreb.

The Croatian authorities should send many policemen to this area to maintain law and order and prevent the abuse of the helpless Serb population in Krajina, Ourtoobis said.

She said 92 imprisoned Serbs were registered in Croatian prisons which the ICRC visits, but that there had to be more whom the ICRC could not reach.

Ourtoobis said relatives of imprisoned or missing Krajina Serbs should cooperate more actively with the ICRC because when this organization registered the existence of a prisoner, it was a guarantee that he was alive and would stay alive.

In closing, Ourtoobis told the Novi Sad daily that the Croatian authorities should change many things for these people to be able to remain living in Krajina.

Croatia: Official on Preparations for Bosnian Elections

AU1608104296 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA
in Serbo-Croatian 12 Aug 96 p 4

[Interview with Damir Zoric, chairman of the Croatian Government's Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees, by Sandra Caric; place and date not given: "Jelacic Square Without Rallies of Political Parties"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted]

Unrealistic Time Limits

[Caric] The time limits for the registration of refugees who want to participate in the forthcoming elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina are too short and there are also problems in supplying registration forms, which should have been done by the OSCE, which is in charge of the organization of the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina. How would you comment on this?

[Zoric] The OSCE is confronted with many more problems than it assumed at the beginning, since certain time limits were set before it was checked whether all the organizations the OSCE relied on could perform their tasks within these limits. We have opened as many as 18 registration points for the citizens who want to vote and additional 55 temporary points that are open one day a week in those communities in which a large number of refugees live, with the goal of making it easier for the people to register and to save transportation costs.

[Caric] Is it an exaggeration to say that the OSCE went into the project without having considered the matter seriously enough, that it was not completely aware of the problems with which it would have to cope?

[Zoric] I have to admit that I was relatively impressed by the courage of Robert Frowick, who recently admitted that the voters from Bosnia-Herzegovina were poorly informed about the conditions and the way in which they should vote, since he is the person most likely to be blamed for that shortcoming. You rarely come across such people. It is quite clear to me that the OSCE has to fulfill a series of requirements regarding many heterogeneous and extremely sensitive problems that are difficult to solve even under completely normal circumstances without any trauma. Apart from that, election time always makes people more nervous, angry, and emotional. And if everything has to be done under very painful and sensitive circumstances like in this

case, it is clear that the situation is precarious and that great efforts have to be made if we want that everything is correct. The OSCE is not an exception in comparison with other international organizations, although it seems to me that it was given a mandate to repair the things that others failed to do.

"We Can Do It"

[Caric] Concretely, what will the election be like in the field?

[Zoric] Let me give you an example from Bjelovar after approximately 30 percent of the registration forms of Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens who are entitled to vote and who live in the area of that regional office have been processed. These people come from over 100 places, from more than 40 communes in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The registration went as like follows: The registration was done in Bjelovar for 35 communes, in Cazma for 18, in Daruvar for 22, in Garesnica for 17, and in Grubisno Polje for 21 communes. If you take into account that these elections allow voting for representatives in two entities, voting in communes in which the people lived before the aggression or in communes in which they want to live after the war, as well as voting in absentia or in person, you can understand how complicated the mechanism for the distribution of ballot papers is. In one word, it will be very complicated, very difficult, and very demanding, but we can do it.

[Caric] Can this kind of election put the Dayton peace agreement at stake?

[Zoric] It seems that there is no one else to ask this question, so I am often asked it. It is not up to us to make such assessments. It is our duty to offer the possibility to everyone to make use of his voting right if he wants to. I cannot make assessments about whether a certain model has advantages or shortcomings, people have to assess this, since something I might consider a shortcoming may be considered an advantage by someone else and vice versa. I think that the politicians should speak to the people and explain everything. Many voters who have registered have not been informed yet about where the lists of candidates will be placed, whose lists there are, whose programs, and who they should vote for.

[Caric] This confirms the fact that these elections are practically an unsparing battle for the seat of every representative and every commune in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Zoric] Certainly. These elections, regardless of what they will be like, will be interpreted as the creation of the legal basis for the future political, territorial, and any other kind of development in that state. In other words,

they will be the basis for looking into the future. Many things that have happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina and around it have so far boiled down to the struggle for the rights created in the past. In general, these elections, which will be carried under international supervision, will create a legal situation that will be the basis for future relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Cynical World

[Caric] What are your reactions to the report in THE WASHINGTON POST that the Bosnian Serbs are making use of this voting model in order to try to regain the territories they lost in the Croatian and Muslim liberation actions?

[Zoric] The astonishment of the world about something it has created and tolerated seems very cynical to me. This is what I would like to tell everyone who is now suddenly surprised by the Serb behavior, or by the behavior of any other party that makes use of the rules that the international community put at their disposal.

[Caric] There were certain signs of irregularities in registration. Is it possible to disclose or avoid them?

[Zoric] There has been no negative response to the preparations in Croatia, only to the preparations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in third countries. All our officials are obliged to work according to OSCE rules. Whether some of us will try to cheat and how successful they will be is difficult to predict. These are only speculations. We cannot be made responsible for that, but we can be made responsible if we fail to disclose or prevent cheating and forgery, which are possible. The sanctioning of persons who violate election rules is not our responsibility; the OSCE Commission in Sarajevo is in charge of these matters, since the votes from all over the world will be sent there, and we are only a part of the system.

[Caric] How are voters in Croatia being informed about the forthcoming election?

[Zoric] All parties and candidates are allowed to organize information activities. In fact, they are desirable. It is quite clear, however, that it will not be allowed, for example, that a Muslim party organizes a rally on the Jelacic Square [main square in Zagreb], since this is forbidden by both the election rules and Croatian legislation. Information can be disseminated through media, which is a common thing in the democratic world, but political activities by an organization or a party on the territory of another state are not allowed. All political parties can be active in Croatia and inform their voters through Croatian parties, the affiliated political parties that cooperate closely with those

in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and there are many of these in Croatia. As I have already said, I am surprised that this possibility is not being made more use at present, in the preelection period.

Croatia: Police Arrest Senior Bosnian Army Officer
LD1508173296 Sarajevo Radio Hajat
in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 15 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] On Saturday, 10 August, Croatian police arrested Mirsad Catic, a senior officer of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, at Buzet border crossing. He was passing through Croatia on his way to Bosnia-Herzegovina with his family, wife, and three children when he was arrested.

At the beginning of the aggression, Mirsad Catic was the commander of the municipal headquarters of territorial defense in Hadzici [west of Sarajevo], commander of the territorial defense in Konjic, and commander of Tactical Group Two of the Bosnian Army. He was wounded on 10 August 1992 and spent the rest of the war receiving treatment. During his treatment abroad, Mirsad Catic passed through Croatia on several occasions. It is therefore surprising that he is arrested now.

It is obvious that this arrest in Croatia and the subsequent imputation of alleged war crimes is a continuation of an orchestrated campaign and the practice of defamation of Bosnian patriots, particularly of senior officers of the Bosnian Army, despite all the agreements signed so far. This case confirms that the forces opposed to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation are still strong; through such actions, they are trying to do everything to prevent the creation of the Bosnian Army, the statement by the Bosnian Army press center says.

Croatia: Croat Families From Kosovo To Settle in Kistanje

AU1608102096 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA
in Serbo-Croatian 14 Aug 96 p 5

[Article by Z. Juras: "180 Houses in Kistanje Given to Janjevo Croats"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Knin—The Government Commission for the Municipalities of Kistanje, Ervenik,

Orlic, and Civljane has engaged in revitalizing these places, which have been abandoned to a great extent. About 180 Croat families from Janjevo [in Kosovo] are soon to sign contracts with the Ministry of Reconstruction and Development on occupying houses in Kistanje. They will become inhabitants of Kistanje and contribute to the development of that part of Bukovica. The reconstruction of the Catholic Church of the Lady of Health in Kistanje, popularly called St. Anne, is almost finished. The interior of the building is being repaired, the roof truss is finished, and the surroundings of the church have been organized. In this church, which was more timeworn than devastated by Chetniks, the first mass will be held in approximately a month's time, thanks to the dynamic reconstruction conducted by the Zadar archdiocese. The Zadar archdiocese also has churches in Nimic and Ervenik in the Knin region. Fortunately, these churches did not suffer much damage during the war.

Petar Pasic, commissioner for the Municipalities of Ervenik and Kistanje, said that the Unija Sabirac company from Sibenik is collecting garbage in Kistanje. The employees of the company happened to find something very interesting while depositing garbage on the garbage dump in Karanovici. They discovered eight church bells that were taken from Catholic churches in the Knin and Drnis regions during the occupation. The Knin police will try to find out how and from which churches the bells came to Kistanje.

Archbishop Ivan Prendja recently visited the village of Ervenik, which is also a part of the Zadar Archdiocese. He announced that the diocesan Caritas organization from Zadar might soon organize a convalescent home for drug addicts in Ervenik.

FYROM: Date for Frckovski-Panghalos Meeting Not Fixed*AU1508152696 Skopje MIC in English 15 Aug 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] "The meeting between the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Foreign Minister and the Greek Foreign Minister was not arranged to be held in New York in September, and due to this, there is nothing to be cancelled," high officials of the Macedonian Foreign Ministry have stated in the absence of Macedonian Foreign Minister Frckovski, who is on a vacation.

"It is true that ministers Frckovski and Panghalos will be in New York at the beginning of September, where they will participate into the preparations of the UN General Assembly. It is a custom for the diplomats who attend such big international meetings to use them for bilateral, either formal or informal meetings. In this context there was an opportunity for a meeting Frckovski-Panghalos, but it wasn't fixed," the same source stated.

In addition, the Greek side has cancelled this potential meeting in New York as a result of the recent interviews of Macedonian Foreign Minister Frckovski given to the Austrian daily DER STANDART and the Greek daily TO VIMA, in which he stated that the change of the name of Macedonia was not possible.

FYROM: Handziski Discusses Military's Reconstruction*AU1608070696 Skopje Radio Macedonia Network in Macedonian 1330 GMT 15 Aug 96*

[Statement by Macedonian Defense Minister Blagoj Handziski at a news conference in Skopje; date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Armed Forces have been fully restructured to NATO's standards. New positions and rules have been introduced. In spite of the embargo, the defense units have been equipped with automatic weapons and the conditions for the rapid deployment of Army units have been established with the provision of military trucks. The initial conditions for the training of military pilots have been established through the provision of training and fighting aircrafts. The special units of the Army are also fully equipped with weapons to NATO standards. An adequate contingent for participation in the exercises of the Partnership for Peace [PFP] and NATO has been trained, as well as for participation in peace operations, which are also equipped to NATO standards. We have participated as observers in 10 PFP and NATO exercises. Half of the contingent for peace operations participated in the "Peaceful Eagle" exercises, which were held in Albania in 1996, together

with the forces of the United States, Italy, Greece, Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania. The training, the readiness, and the dedication of the officers in our contingent were assessed highly by the leaders of the exercise. We are also completing our preparations for the organization of the First Command Staff Exercise in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] in October this year, in which some alliance members will participate actively, like the United States, Italy, Greece, and Turkey, as well as some PFP members; Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovenia. Poland and Hungary will be observers. This exercise will be a precursor to the biggest joint tactical exercise that will take place in the region. This will take place within the framework of the PFP and NATO at the start of next year in the area of Krivolak.

FYROM: DPM Leader on 'Pristina-Tirana-Tetovo Triangle'*AU1608082596 Skopje Radio Macedonia Network in Macedonian 1330 GMT 15 Aug 96*

[Report by Jovan Bulevski]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Democratic Party of Macedonia [DPM] held a news conference at which Tomislav Stojanovski, the leader of the party, said that tension is rising not only in Tetovo, but throughout Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. Stojanovski put particular emphasis on the Pristina-Tirana-Tetovo triangle, which he says is using education as a pretext to increase the tension. He also criticized the police—who he said were inactive during the protests of the Albanians under the slogan "We Are Asking for Protection," when passers-by were left unprotected and had to escape from demonstrators waving the Albanian flag and shouting.

Stojanovski said the Democratic Party of Macedonia holds the view that all the political parties of the Albanians, not excluding the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity], have the same goals but use different methods. Their common goals are the legalization of the so-called university in the Albanian language in the village of Mala Recica near Tetovo, recognition of the Albanian minority as a constituent nation, and the introduction of Albanian as an official language in the Republic of Macedonia, which is contrary to the Constitution. All these parties' activities are aimed at obtaining new concessions in the Assembly, particularly in light of the forthcoming local elections and the adoption of the law on territorial division. Their goal is to show the international public that the status of the Albanian minority is inadequate, even though the Albanian minority in Macedonia actually enjoys all minority rights, more than anywhere else in the world.

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FYROM: PDP Leader Opts for 'Harmonization' of View

AU1408170996 Skopje DNEVNIK in Macedonian
14 Aug 96 p 4

[Interview with Abdurahman Aliti, PDP president, by Ilir Ajdini; place and date not given: "Either Legalization of University or State of Emergency"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Ajdini] Your statement, which has recently been communicated by Radio Tirana, and in which you say that unless the question of university education in the Albanian language is not solved you will leave the parliament and the government, caused numerous reactions and served as an initiative for new debate between your party and "Tetovo university." What is it actually about?

[Aliti] As a matter of fact, I did not state anything new for Radio Tirana, I only repeated some statements of over a year and a half ago. It was all stated conditionally, in the style "if it turns out that way, we will be doing this." This is not just my personal view, but also that of the Central Presidency and the Central Assembly of the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity]. It is fully related to the question of university education in Albanian and the ways and forms for its institutionalization, that is a "modus vivendi" for a university in the Albanian language.

[Ajdini] What are your visions about the way in which the question of university education in Albanian can be solved?

[Aliti] In spite of the various statements of the high ranking officials in the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], including the one by Prime Minister Crvenkovski that was given for ZERI, in which he claims that the question of the university has been solved as an anticonstitutional question, I still believe that strength and political courage is necessary in Macedonia to solve this issue. It is unreal to expect the Albanian political side to renounce this legitimate right and if there is not enough political will on the side of the Macedonian authorities—speaking about visions, I believe that Macedonia will be faced with two alternatives: The first, and the better, is to give legal grounds for a university in Albanian, by which all possibilities for inconsiderate and undesired activities would be eliminated; the second alternative is the road of violence for obstructing the educational process, which would normally result into a state of emergency that would be maintained with police, perhaps even military forces. I do not see any other alternatives for now.

[Ajdini] In what way will the PDP pledge in the future for the solution of the question of university education in Albanian, and in this context what is your opinion about the recent message of the Information Service of the "Tetovo university" in which they say that they do not want you to be interested in the "university" any more?

[Aliti] I did not understand from the message that somebody does not want PDP to be interested in the university, but that they do not want us to be interested in the fate of the prisoners, which is their right. We are ready to fulfill their wish and we will not be interested in them. As far as the university is concerned, whether PDP will be engaged or not, does not depend on the wish of some persons from the university or around it. Nobody has the exclusive right on the Albanian spirit and patriotic feelings and nobody can have a monopoly. The interest for education in the mother tongue on all levels belongs equally to all, and nobody has less or more rights in this field. We will continue to insist that the law on university education allow the possibility for the creation of higher educational institutions using the Albanian language, including the organization of a university, where the lectures would be also in Albanian. This is not a new determination, but it has existed since the formation of the party. So, the tendencies of some people who are trying to prove that there is a formulation towards a political radicalization in the global political line of the PDP are futile. There are not any elements of radicalization; there is nothing but a political consistency in the accomplishment of the determinations.

[Ajdini] In your opinion, which is the reason for this conduct of the "Tetovo university" toward the PDP?

[Aliti] The question, which requires a deeper and comprehensive analysis, is why is it happening right now, at this time? We must take into consideration that inside and around the university nothing new happened in this period, that is that its current position has not been changed at all. The question that the position is unsatisfactory is another matter. The only thing that happened was that the court's decisions that were made before have been confirmed. If a revolt were necessary, a dissent or something of the kind, it had to come at the time the sentences were made. So, it is very indicative why all this is happening right now, in conditions when there are not any new events taking place in or around the university, and it is also indicative that we as a party received information about four months ago that there will be a campaign against the PDP. The information said that there would be a campaign against PDP and against its president. I gave it long thought, but I could not anticipate who would initiate and back up this

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campaign. I did not expect at all that it would come from the structures of the university. It is really interesting why this attack was done right now and why from there. Time will show what it is really about.

As far as the various claims that "PDP's masks have finally fallen down" are concerned and that we are only verbally supporting the university, we as a party are willing to discuss it with any Albanian subject and to prove with facts who has done what for the university. I will admit immediately that, speaking of words, the others have done much more. However, speaking about concrete contribution—nobody has done more or not even nearly what we have done. The offer remains open. Those who believe they have done more than us are free to expose facts. I repeat, I do not intend to compete with words, because I know in advance that others have more words than we do.

[Ajidini] How and how much does this situation affect the solution of the question of university education in Albania?

[Aliti] We are aware that the altercations among the Albanian political parties cannot contribute to the solution of this question. On the contrary, I am convinced that they are slowing down to the point of making the solution of the problem impossible. It is really a wonder how serious persons could allow themselves to be involved in such a game. The reason can be either bad information or ignorance, or, God Save us, something totally different.

[Ajidini] In the interparty altercations, there are frequent manipulations involving Tirana's attitude toward some political parties of the Albanians in Macedonia. What is your assessment about this attitude?

[Aliti] The claims that Albania supported this or that party are on the level of political speculations. The attitude of Tirana's Government in this sense is totally clear: It either supports equally or it does not support all the parties and there are not any dilemmas or possibilities for additional speculations.

[Ajidini] Some time ago, exactly during the period of divisions and actions within the PDP, there existed a conflict between your party and the ruling Democratic Party of Albania.

[Aliti] I do not agree that there was a conflict or dissent on an interparty level. It is true that there were some misunderstandings and conflicts among some persons from the one and the other party, which was often interpreted as an interparty conflict.

[Ajidini] Rudi Osmani, member of parliament of the PDPA [Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians],

gave an interview to FOCUS in which he called you "Macedonia's Rahman Morina," and he also accused some ministers in the Macedonian Government from your party of corruption.

[Aliti] I heard about his interview, but I have not read it. To be honest, knowing the level on which this person communicates, I do not even have a desire to read it. I am never interested in people, but this time I am going to make an exception. I will only say that it would have been good if this young man had remained in his profession, because I am convinced that he would have made an excellent accountant. It is a pity for him to have started to be engaged in policy that he does not know at all.

[Box, p 4]

Centers "Caring" for the Parties

[Ajidini] The relations among the political parties of the Albanians in Macedonia are very tense, which is reflected on divisions among the Albanian population itself. Where do you see a solution to this situation?

[Aliti] There is not a single case in the world where the nation is unanimous on all opinions, and I do not believe that we can be an exception. So, the rising requests for unity, in my opinion, are exaggerated and I would prefer to talk about harmonization of the views and political activities that have a common goal. As an illustration, I would like to point out as follows: Some time ago, some representatives of the Albanian political parties were unanimous in saying that there are no substantial differences among them on the key questions and that harmonization of activities is fully possible and real. These statements, which were equally given by the leaders of the NDP [People's Democratic Party] and the PDPA, excited the spirits in the "center" that is supervising the activities of the Albanian political parties. So, I suppose that all this mess is a result of some scenarios that are prepared in these centers.

FYROM: PDP Protests Tetovo University's Statements

AU1508135296 Skopje FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT
in Albanian 8 Aug 96 p 3

[Communique by the Party for Democratic Prosperity: "Marxist-Leninists Are Digging Tetovo University's Grave"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After the publication of the latest statement by the Information Service of the Tetovo University, the Party for Democratic Prosperity [PPD] issued the following communique for the media:

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The PPD reacts indignantly to the primitive yells of some pack of wolves who, from the reborn Marxist-Leninist caves, are addressing the public with anti-Albanian statements bearing the name and seal of Tetovo University. The statement issued yesterday [7 August] by the Tetovo University Information Council is the most concrete evidence that the packs of wolves are howling from their caves against the PPD and are directed from circles outside this institution, whose leaders and spokesmen are hidden and which the PPD has long ago denounced in the press as well. The acts carried out by these persons intent on turning Tetovo University from a temple that should radiate the culture of communication, political civilization, national unity, and prosperity into a sphinx that cuts off the heads of all those who do not know how to answer her questions about the political and national rifts among Albanians.

This is the reason we believe the leading structures of this university should be aware of the danger with irreparable consequences, which results from the acts of these packs of wolves bearing the name and seal of the university and which affects the future destiny of the institution. At the same time, they should also be aware that they might be the most perfidious killers of this university, using foreign bullets. Being aware of the fact that the statement issued yesterday has been written without the knowledge of vice rector Agni Dika, who is currently carrying out the functions of rector, the PPD asks him to issue a public statement in this regard, says the communique.

FYROM: PDPA, NDP Ask International Help To Free Sulejmani

AU1508152396 Skopje MIC in English 15 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The whole Albanian public is irritated by the reckless policy of the Macedonian [The

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Government and other state bodies, expressed in the imprisonment of the activists of the illegal Tetovo University. At the meetings, a firmer engagement of the international organizations was demanded, in order to release the political convicts and to legalize the illegal Tetovo University.

This is stated in the PDPA [Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians] report following yesterday's meeting of delegations of PDPA, NDP [People's Democratic Party], Albanian Women's Association, and representatives of the illegal Tetovo University, with representatives of OSCE, UNPREDEP [UN Preventive Deployment], and the U.S. Embassy in Macedonia.

At the meeting, the Albanian representatives assessed the arrests of the Albanian people as "unjust, illegal and politically harmful, because they push all the citizens into dangerous intolerance."

"The goal of these unfair arrests is to install the mechanism of ethnic antagonism and to drive the attention of the citizens away from the economic and social problems, and the Macedonian Government frightens the Macedonian people on purpose, with the 'made up' Albanian menace."

Poland: Prime Minister, Defense Official on Tanks for Bosnia

WS1608112896 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA
in Polish 16 Aug 96 p 2

[Article by P.W.R.: "Secret Talks With the U.S. Have Taken Place"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Secret talks with the United States have taken place on the sale of Polish tanks to Bosnia, the Polish prime minister admitted while answering a question by RZECZPOSPOLITA. However, he denied allegations that the contract, worth \$50 million, had not been signed because of the bureaucratic disarray reigning in his government.*

RZECZPOSPOLITA asked Prime Minister Cimoszewicz whether Poland is interested in selling the tanks to Bosnia, and, if so, who is responsible for the fact that the negotiations on the contract are delayed, dragging out for several months now. The Cabinet chief admitted that the Americans sent a proposal for a contract to Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski, who informed the president, the prime minister, and the interior minister about it. The prime minister said that the case is very delicate, adding that the Polish authorities want first to think over all of the aspects of the deal and learn the details of the American proposal. He emphasized that West European states had not decided to engage in this type of undertaking. He recalled that Bosnia is a sensitive area and that one should not move around there "with the elegance of an elephant in a china shop."

Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz denied statements that the contract had not been signed because of the bureaucratic mess in the ministries. In his opinion, such charges are caused by political considerations.

As a reminder, as early as last Tuesday [13 Aug], government officials claimed that they knew nothing about the case. So did representatives of the Foreign Economic Cooperation Ministry and the General Staff, while people from the Defense Ministry refused to talk with journalists altogether. According to some newspapers and legislative deputies, because of the long delay in making a decision, Poland has lost its chance of signing the contract because the United States had sent a similar offer to Slovakia. They claim that the main reason the Polish side is unwilling to make a decision is the fear of worsening relations with Serbia and Russia. REUTER recalled that Polish Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati said during his visit to the United States last month that Poland would not deliver tanks to Bosnia because it concluded an agreement with EU countries obligating it not to sell arms to that region.

[Warsaw SZTANDAR in Polish, in the 16-18 August issue, on page 1 carries the following report: "In an interview to SZTANDAR, a high-ranking official from the Defense Ministry resolutely defended the opinion that Poland's decision not to accept a contract, proposed by the United States, for delivering 45 T-72 tanks to the Bosnian Army was correct. Because of this, we have lost \$50 million. The official advocated the point that 'sending more arms to Sarajevo would have provoked a retaliatory Serbian blow on our soldiers serving as part of the NATO-IFOR troops.' 'Why do all those who are so vigorously pressing Poland, of all countries, to send its tanks to the Muslim army not deliver armored equipment to Bosnia themselves?' This is what we heard from our interlocutor."

"We have learned from American sources that Washington selected Poland as a potential supplier of tanks to Sarajevo for technical rather than political reasons. It was assumed that Bosnian soldiers, who are more accustomed to unsophisticated weapon systems, would master the skill of operating the T-72 tank quicker than, for example, the M-60 Patton tank. Besides, the former Yugoslavia used to manufacture its own licensed T-72's, which lessens the problem of spare parts and ammunition. In addition, Poland tacitly sought compensation from the United States for the suspended contract to sell our T-72 tanks to Iran (the deal was halted by former Defense Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski)."

Poland: Gen Wilecki on General Staff Tasks, Structure

WS1508145796 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA
in Polish 14-15 Aug 96 p 5

[Article by General Tadeusz Wilecki, chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces: "The General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, a Relic of the Past or a Modern Command Organ"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Until recently, the discussion about civilian control of the armed forces aroused a lot of controversy. Now it is slowly subsiding. One of the reasons it is subsiding is certainly the fact that democratic mechanisms that have been consistently introduced into the defense system over the past few years are beginning to function more and more efficiently, and their beneficial results are noticeable not only to experts, who are convinced about their infallibility, but also to general public opinion. The problem is slowly ceasing to be a problem.*

Nonetheless, it is too bad that some participants in the discussion about the place and the role of the armed forces in modern Polish society led it not with the help of arguments, but in an atmosphere of libel and not

very elegant attacks on the armed forces, on higher-ranking officers, and on the institutions of command, primarily the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces. They attempted to portray it as a mysterious institution that aims to push the democratic organs of authority on defense issues, including the Ministry of National Defense [MON], away from the limelight. The General Staff supposedly wanted to excessively build up its own structures, which it allegedly needed to assume complete control over the armed forces. They argued that the General Staff had political aspirations and authoritarian plans. It was alleged to be the bulwark of conservatism, if not backwardness—and not only professional; it was supposedly immune to change and modernity. Now that emotions have died down, it is probably high time to try to present the real picture of the General Staff.

The sovereign defense system of Poland is still in its formative phase. Its management structures are still new and only beginning to find the right rhythm of functioning. Therefore, there appears the natural desire to perfect, restructure, and improve the structures in order to reach the coveted ideal. Suggestions—some are less and others are more justified—that it is necessary to verify the structures once again are made with regard to the command system of the armed forces as well. Some people put forward the proposition that in view of the plan to establish the Ground Forces Command, it is unnecessary to have a central organ commanding the armed forces; that in the General Staff structures there are organizational units similar to those that exist in MON; that posts in the General Staff are too high and that some of them might be transferred to combat units. One can also hear opinions that the General Staff should be liquidated completely because its existence impedes democratic supervision over the armed forces. Thus, what was, what is, and what should the General Staff be? What are its tasks and functions? Is it really indispensable?

In the postwar years, the organization and work of the General Staff were affected by the Soviet models. Incidentally, it went through numerous processes of reorganization and change. Nonetheless, two things were unchangeable and of decisive importance: membership in the Warsaw Pact and the role MON played in the "people's" republic. Being part of the "defense alliance of fraternal states" meant that all of the Polish operational troops had to be part of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact; in wartime those troops were commanded through the so-called chief commands in the theaters of military operations directly and in line with the plans of the Soviet General Staff. Within its borders, Poland could keep only the Home Air Defense Troops, the territorial troops, and the civil defense units. The

Polish General Staff had the task of selecting the Polish front for the Joint Armed Forces; it also had to "feed," replenish, and provide security if any operations were carried out. The area of "strategic thought" referred only to the tasks assigned in the plans of the Joint Command and constituted only one of the segments the General Staff was interested in. These regulations were formally written into official documents.

The other thing that affected the functions of the General Staff at that time was its positioning in MON of the Polish People's Republic. At that time, there existed the so-called central institutions of MON; the General Staff was not the most important among them. The chief of the General Staff was one of the seven deputies to the national defense minister, and the functions the General Staff fulfilled practically boiled down to providing expertise to the decisionmaking military bodies in the country and to making appearances whenever necessary. Most important, at that time, the General Staff did not have the possibility of planning the use of the entire armed forces to defend the country; it could only carry out the tasks that resulted from our participation in the Warsaw Pact. It must be admitted, though, that the General Staff was an organ well prepared for the latter.

The year 1989 came. It was obvious that the defense system of the Polish Republic, particularly its armed forces, had to be reformed. Sovereign Poland needed and needs modern and well-prepared armed forces. To ensure good and modern management of those forces, it was necessary to have not only an efficient organ of command, but also an institution that could successfully carry out the intellectual task of developing the concept of strategic defense, implementing modern normative documents, maintaining combat readiness and effectiveness of the troops. Finally, the country needed a tool that would manage to define, plan, and carry out the multitude of tasks related to the reduction and reorganization of the armed forces.

The reorganization work began in the fall of 1990. In June 1991, the Interministerial Commission for Reforms in the Organization of National Defense drew up a report that included a concept of sweeping reforms. In June 1991, this concept was approved by the National Defense Committee and the Council of Ministers of the Polish Republic. The authors specified the basic directions of solutions in the area of political-administrative management of MON, command of the armed forces, their composition and strength, and the basic organizational structures in the various branches of the armed forces.

In August 1991, work on restructuring MON and the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces began. It was

decided that in the new structure of managing MON the functions of commanding the armed forces would be separated from the broadly interpreted political management and administration. To make this possible, two functional sections were established: the civilian-military section and the military section.

In line with these regulations, the minister of national defense, a civilian, was to bear responsibility for political and administrative management of the ministry, as well as for the strategic and defense planning in the country, development of the armed forces, and their preparation for the defense of the Polish Republic. His other responsibilities included shaping the country's defense policy in cooperation with other ministries, carrying out decisions made by the chief organs of the state authorities, and settling important issues regarding international cooperation and cooperation with other ministries.

The military section was to be made up of the armed forces, prepared to carry out tasks to defend the country. The section was to be headed by the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces—the general inspector of the Polish Armed Forces. In line with the decision made by the authors of the report, the process of commanding the entire armed forces was to reflect the basic relations as presented in the following model: The General Staff of the Armed Forces, the only central organ of armed forces command, commands military districts and the branches of the armed forces, which in turn command higher tactical units and regional organs of the military administration, down to the commands of divisions.

In line with these regulations, the General Staff of the Armed Forces regained the function of the central command organ of the entire Polish Armed Forces, a function it had lost during the past 40 years. As a result, its powers included tasks of planning, training, supply, and command, which enabled it to gradually become a modern military organ, similar to those that function in NATO states. It is similar but not identical.

The thing is that in NATO two structures can be distinguished: the political structure and the military structure. The political structure consists of all kinds of bodies, including the highest decisionmaking organ in NATO—the North Atlantic Council. The military structure consists of the following: the Military Committee (the highest military organ in NATO) and the International Military Staff, which is the executive organ of the Military Committee. The organs that command the NATO forces are the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Armed Forces—in Europe and the Atlantic. Subordinated to them are appropriate regional commands; in turn, the commands of the ground, air, and naval forces are sub-

ordinated to the regional commands. Thus, aside from national commands, there are well-developed coalition command structures for NATO troops and forces that function in peacetime. Within the alliance, these organs wield command over strategic groups of troops. Taking advantage of this fact, some countries have decided to delegate many tasks related to commanding troops in wartime to those commands. This does not mean that those countries have given up the idea of having national general staffs or staffs of defense—staff and command organs able to ensure strategic development and coordination of operations carried out by all of their armed forces.

Two parallel command systems functioning in NATO states: national commands, which in peacetime fulfill functions related to commanding national troops in peacetime and wartime, and multinational allied commands, whose task is to command the troops that have been selected to form the Joint Armed Forces of NATO.

It is true that the structure and powers of the general staffs (of defense) of the countries that are part of NATO differ slightly from our General Staff. This results not only from history and tradition but also primarily from the geostrategic role and the area of responsibility of the armed forces (they are different, for example, for the Armed Forces of Great Britain and the Netherlands), as well as from the composition of the troops, the tasks carried out in peacetime, and the functions that are envisioned for wartime.

However, regardless of all differences, the aforementioned system of NATO command favors national command systems as a basis, and each country that is part of NATO has such a system. This is because it is not so that the coalition systems of command in the alliance have or will take over all functions in the event of a conflict, that they will replace the national organs. The national general staffs (of defense) remain, regardless of the existence of group organs, the sole decisionmaking centers with regard to the operations carried out by the armed forces of a given member state of the alliance.

In most countries, in case of war the office of the chief commander is to be held (titularly or practically) by heads of states—presidents or kings (in the Federal Republic of Germany [FRG], by the chancellor). Direct command over the armed forces is wielded by military officers with appropriate powers (inspectors, chiefs of staffs, and so forth) through "general" staffs (the Operational Staff of the Armed Forces Command—the FRG; the Staff of the Armed Forces—France, and so forth). Directly subordinated to those staffs are the commands (staffs) of the various branches of the armed forces—ground, air, naval, and other forces. To them,

in turn, subordinated are major troop units, such as field armies in France, army corps in the FRG, military districts in Spain, and so forth.

There is absolutely no country that has given up the idea of having its own efficient military "brain." On the contrary, these organs are developed, given ultramodern equipment and the most valuable people. Is our General Staff able to match the best? Will its organization, equipment, and staff make it possible to carry out tasks in peacetime and in wartime? What is its current structure and what are its tasks? One can, or rather could, in the past sometimes hear people voice fears that the General Staff wants to have exclusive influence on the armed forces. Were these fears justified?

The current situation is absolutely clear. On 15 July 1995, the Sejm passed the law on the Office of the National Defense Minister. It specifies that the minister carries out his tasks with the help of MON, part of which is the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces.

This document finally puts an end to various speculations about the mutual relations between the national defense minister and the chief of the General Staff. Despite what some people say, the possibilities of ordering the system of managing the country's defense and commanding the armed forces, as created by this law, are quite considerable and generally positive. As usual, however, it is the details or, more specifically, interpretation of the provisions of this law that is the most difficult to handle.

In line with the will of the legislators, the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces commands, on behalf of the national defense minister, the armed forces in peacetime and carries out his tasks with the help of the General Staff.

Thus, the General Staff is part of the ministry, a component that is not privileged but also not discriminated against. It is a separate central organ of armed forces command of the Polish Republic. In line with the decisions that have been made so far, the fundamental tasks carried out by this organ are as follows: participation in the working out of the defense doctrine and the country's primary defense guidelines, supervision of the part of strategic-defense planning that relates to the armed forces, as well as preparation of the concept of developing the armed forces and supervision of the planning of this development. Moreover, it is also in charge of the process of maintaining combat and mobilization readiness, training and education of the armed forces, logistics, and maintenance of discipline and military order.

The chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces carries out these tasks directly through his four

deputies: the first deputy to the chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, as well as the chief of the Training Inspectorate, chief of the Logistics Inspectorate, and chief of Territorial Defense.

This institution has been performing its tasks for quite a long time now; it is an efficient decisionmaking organ. Contrary to popular opinion, most of its employees are not generals and colonels but, rather, majors and lieutenant colonels. There is a large group of captains; there are even second lieutenants. Also, there is a sizable group of warrant officers and civilian employees. The relatively high military ranks of the officers working in the General Staff are by no means accidental. The unique character of the work requires that the General Staff employ people who are well prepared, both in theory and in practice, and that they have sufficient knowledge not only in a limited military field but also in at least several fields. These people must have considerable mental toughness, physical abilities, and all-round general education. This requires many years of study and close contact with the military service.

One would like the best people to get jobs in the General Staff. There was a time when service in this institution was the highest military distinction; it was evidence of great professionalism, intellectual maturity, the rare "staff" ability to work, and responsibility. Over the past four years, a lot has been achieved to restore the high prestige of work and service in the General Staff. These are not empty words. The achievements of this period, achievements about which, obviously, one cannot and must not publicly boast, justifies such a statement.

Construction of the intellectual potential of the General Staff takes years. Collecting top-notch specialists is a task as difficult as looking for diamonds. However, once such an efficient team is formed, it becomes an asset that cannot be overestimated. Today we are looking at our armed forces through the prism of financial means, warfare agents, materials. More specifically, we are looking at the armed forces through the prism of the permanent lack of these things. Although it will be possible to make up for material shortages once the situation in the country improves, squandering intellectual achievements and breaking up an extremely efficient team of staff employees may turn out to be an irretrievable loss.

Poland: Administrative Center Reform Discussed96EP0086A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 20 Jul 96
No 29, p 17

[Article by Janina Paradowska: "The PSL Is a Loser: The Central Government Reinvents Itself"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For the second time, so soon again, the PSL [Polish Peasant Party] has commenced playing a political game, from which it has emerged the loser. It had a chance to win in its attempts to have the minister of privatization recalled, had it not been for the tortuous and incomprehensible machinations of Chairman Waldemar Pawlak. In the game in which the stakes were to be halting the reform of the central government until agreement was reached within the governing coalition as to the apportionment of ministerial posts, from the beginning they were the losers.

The notion of winning a battle in the absence of any chances whatsoever is, to put it diplomatically, incomprehensible. It looks more like a symptom of desperation than of any hidden political astuteness.

The PSL lacked the two-thirds majority of votes needed to amend the constitution with the object of limiting the powers of the prime minister, and considering that the Senate would not take any position on this matter, the result was that after 21 July the president can quietly sign laws in the form determined by Sejm.

That date is, in one way or another, a watershed. The timetable for translating the reform into reality will in no case be imperiled. A basic concept of the reform, namely the ability of the prime minister to determine more flexibly the composition of the ministerial cabinet, thus is also not imperiled. Thus the SLD [Democratic Left Alliance] was able to look on with folded hands at the days-long squabbling in the Senate and finally point the finger triumphantly at the culprit who wanted to halt all reforms—Pawlak once again.

That politician is indeed beset by exceptionally bad luck; whatever he undertakes he loses. Nothing helps: Neither the look of inscrutability nor the muttering that this concerns resolving problems (a favorite, if worn, motif in the comments of the former prime minister), nor bickering about ministerial appointments. The raw truth is that Pawlak, who had cooperated in the passage of bills to reform the central government, was entitled to greater goodwill from his coalition partner than actually was forthcoming. Pawlak the obstructionist, and the loser once more, has become a suppliant. The only argument still left to the PSL chairman is to slam the door behind him and leave the coalition. But that would be a dangerous ploy given the coming

congress of his own party. That is because, despite the marked constriction of its influence, the PSL still has a considerable stake invested in the coalition. Door-slamming is a luxury that can be afforded three or four months before the elections.

We thus feel rather mystified as to the purpose for which the Senate staged for us an eight-day entertainment in the name of the struggle for government reform. The only clear accomplishment of that spectacle was that it set a new record for the length of a sitting, eight days, and that it resulted in a situation in which, for the first time in its history, the Senate took no position on a law. Other records may also be enumerated in this connection: the length of the intermissions, which was definitely greater than the time spent on the deliberations themselves; the partisanship of the chair, that is, of Speaker Adam Struzik; and the confusion that gripped some of the senators, who could make neither head nor tail of the game being played at the top. Properly speaking, it is hardly surprising that on the following day a motion was presented to remove inebriated senators from the room. I understand that to the less hardy senators who had to endure waiting for hours for news as to whether any back room deals had been made, disentangling the complexities of these games without swigging some booze was simply impossible.

The discussion of the package of government reform laws was not the Senate's first attempt to fundamentally revise the Sejm's decisions. Not so long ago the Democratic Left Alliance maneuvered the Senate into rejecting the law on the purchase of real estate by foreign nationals in order to have that law passed again by Sejm, but this time without the amendments incorporated by the senators, who wanted more restrictions instead of liberalization. More than two years ago, also on the initiative of the SLD, the Senate rejected *in toto* the law on state secrets, because, horrified by the media campaign, the SLD suddenly changed its view and decided that the law in question, praised in Sejm as being an unusually civilized one, was legislative trash, not worth even being amended. Such unexpected changes in positions and views, as well as tactical ploys, are nothing unusual in parliament. The only thing that matters is what can be won. In these matters the Democratic Left Alliance has plainly been the winner, and therefore no one is chiding it about its extraordinary ability to change its views. It is the losers who are not forgiven their mistakes.

Thus, after years of attempts, the reform of the central government has surmounted another obstacle. Now Sejm has yet to take a position on the amendments incorporated in certain laws by the Senate. Most of these amendments are of a legislative nature, and Sejm

is certain to accept them. That is because the level of Sejm legislation has proven to be so "impressive" that, for example, it was resolved that the Office for State Protection will be transferred to the jurisdiction of the prime minister as of 1 October but the attendant powers will not be transferred until 1 January! Thus these powers, which concern national security, will be hanging in the void for three months—a truly seductive vision. To say that some lawmakers' assistants should become red-faced about this is really not enough. The quality of this legislation verges on being scandalous.

Thus the Senate deserves some credit for having caught quite a few mistakes in these laws and introducing some related amendments, although seemingly it was taking no position on any of these matters and the package of government reforms will soon have to be updated. Even so, it will have to be updated anyway, although to a lesser extent, because the haste with which these reforms were prepared is bound to bear fruit in the form of legal and organizational chaos. These reforms clearly can be divided into two parts—the well-prepared part concerning the reorganization of the economic agencies (kudos for Minister Marek Pol who has these days gained the reputation of a superb apolitical civil servant, even in the politically fragmented Senate), and the improperly conceived reform of the central administration, pursued owing to political considerations.

At any rate, the clock is already ticking for such a major logistical operation as reforming the central government. It may turn out that the preparation of a package of laws needed to translate that reform into reality and have it passed by parliament was a modest undertaking compared with what will now have to be done in disbanding some ministries and establishing new ones.

What is more, no one knows what the outcome will be—chaos and administrative paralysis, already evident at the ministries subject to disbandment or restructuring, or an efficiently implemented reorganization.

Refurbishing the Ministerial Cabinet

The following will be disbanded:

- Office of the Ministerial Council
- Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation
- Ministry of Construction and Land Use Management
- Ministry of Industry and Trade
- Ministry of Ownership Transformations
- Ministry of Internal Affairs (in its present shape)
- Central Planning Office

The following will be established:

- Chancellery of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers
- Ministry of the Economy
- Ministry of the Treasury
- Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration
- Government Center for Strategic Studies; Committee for European Integration

In the next stage:

- The ministries of Transportation and Communications will be merged into the Ministry of the Infrastructure.

Romania: Presidential Spokesman on Treaty With Hungary*LD1508152196 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1400 GMT 15 Aug 96*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Tibor Bogdan reports from Bucharest on reactions to the Hungarian-Romanian basic treaty.

[Bogdan] [Passage omitted] Traian Chebeleu, spokesman of the president's office, told Budapest Radio this morning that he welcomed the agreement, and the treaty should be finalized as soon as possible.

When I asked why the Romanian president had on several occasions described Recommendation No. 1201 of the Council of Europe as unacceptable, the spokesman said that had not been the case, he had just thought it was unnecessary to reflect it in the basic treaty, as it contained ambiguous points.

The president's office will only comment on the issue when it has been acquainted with the details of the text, which will be finalized in Budapest next week, the president's spokesman told the radio.

Romania: PSM Welcomes Hungarian Treaty*AU1508172896 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1600 GMT 15 Aug 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Today the Socialist Party of Labor [PSM] issued a communique saying that it wishes Romanian-Hungarian relations to be based on the principles of freedom, independence, and national sovereignty, on a mutually advantageous brotherhood, and a just, durable peace. If the Romanian-Hungarian basic treaty turns out to be beneficial for both countries, the communique points out, that party will welcome its signing.

However, the PSM warns that no interpretation, regardless of how favorable it may seem today, of Recommendation 1201 [of the Council of Europe] can substitute that recommendation itself. Governments come and go, ministers will be replaced, and interpretations cannot improve the text of that recommendation and do not eliminate its traps. The contents of that recommendation might be reinterpreted any time and given back its proper sense: collective rights and territorial autonomy on ethnic principles.

Considering all this, the PSM favors the flourishing of Romanian-Hungarian relations, but does not accept the inclusion in the basic treaty of any stipulation that could undermine those relations and run counter to Romanian national interests.

The Romanian Humanist Party [PUR] also announced that it took notice with exceptional satisfaction of the fact that negotiations on the Romanian-Hungarian bilateral basic treaty have been concluded, and thus, the possibility appeared that it should be signed in the first half of the current year [as heard], points out a communique faxed to our editorial board by the PUR. As a center party which assiduously dedicates its efforts to achieving balance, normality, the encouragement of the human values and the rejection of any kind of discrimination, the PUR will continue to promote, with unaltered consistency, the development of the material, legislative, and social organization preconditions that favor competition among true values by observance of the specific features and traditions of all the people living in Romania, the communique concludes.

Romania: PNL Accepts 'Individual Rights' in Hungarian Treaty*AU1508132796 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1000 GMT 15 Aug 96*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The National Liberal Party [PNL] leadership held a news conference today in Bucharest. [passage omitted] Speaking about the Romanian-Hungarian basic treaty, PNL President Mircea Ionescu-Quintus stated that certain principles of Recommendation 1201 [of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly], namely, those granting individual rights, may be included in the document. Furthermore, the PNL president asserted that the good understanding between our country and Hungary represents a chance for both states to fulfill their wish to join Euro-Atlantic bodies.

Romania: Government Opposes Idea of Ethnic Minorities' Day*AU1508152096 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1000 GMT 15 Aug 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] The Council for Ethnic Minorities has sent a message to the Romanian International Club [CIR] expressing the council's views and requesting an explanation for a CIR declaration of intent that was published on 12 August. The declaration referred to a proclamation making 15 August the national day of ethnic minorities. The council's message points out that before publishing their intent, the initiators of the action should have consulted all ethnic minorities in the country and asked for their consent.

A communique issued by the Romanian Government and signed by its executive secretary, Ivan Druta, stressed that it does not understand why there should be any need to observe a national day of ethnic

minorities—especially considering that based on available information, ethnic minorities celebrated 1 December as the national day of Romania, the citizens of which they are, and which is the national day of their birth country. Are there really problems of such gravity here that would justify such an action? Is there no danger whatsoever that this initiative could be interpreted as separatism—wonders the communique. It also states that Romania is inhabited by Orthodox believers, Catholics, Greek Catholics, Orthodox believers of Old Rite, Muslims, Baptists, and Mosaic believers, and therefore observing the national day of ethnic minorities on St. Mary's or St. Dumitru's Day [15 August] could cause dissatisfaction among believers of other religions; the CIR should explain the criteria on which it selected this day, as well as whom they intended to favor or disfavor.

The Council for Ethnic Minorities suggests that the CIR should detail this initiative and disclose the organization it represents during the meeting of the Commission for Culture, Religious Cults, and Mass Media, scheduled to take place on 3 September 1996 at 1100.

Also today the Council for Ethnic Minorities notified the press that on 21 August at 1100 it will hold a news conference at Victoria Palace [government headquarters], during which it will brief journalists about the third conference of Governments Acting for Ethnic Minorities, which is to be jointly organized by the Council of Europe and the Council for Ethnic Minorities. The conference is to be held in Bucharest on 10 and 11 September, and is to be attended by representatives of government bodies of 20 countries, persons in charge of ethnic minority issues, as well as by representatives of citizens belonging to the ethnic minorities in Romania.

Romania: Cabinet Reshuffle Seen as 'Eyewash' To Gain Votes

AU1508164996 Bucharest ZIUA in Romanian
12 Aug 96 p 12

[Commentary by Adrian Patrusca: "Cosmetic Patchwork"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Actually, Ion Iliescu's summer vacation is nothing but a strategic pullout from his tumultuous public life to seclusion in the Scrovistea woods [summer residence]. After his rough, rodeo-like ride on the back of the horse called PDSR [ruling Social Democracy Party of Romania] at the most recent national conference of that party—during which the president tried to break it in using his spurs and whip—he must have felt the need to give the electors, so shocked by his massive involvement in our political

life, the chance to catch their breath. Iliescu does not use his vacation to rest. All that has happened is that the control panel has temporarily moved from Cotroceni Palace to the Scrovistea woods, its handles and buttons running hot under the president's fingers, operating strategic maneuvers to prepare his great battle for a new presidential term.

From this angle, the expected reshuffle of the Vacaroiu cabinet was a skillful move. In order to avoid Iliescu and the PDSR having to engage in the electoral campaign bearing the heavy burden of the most unpopular government in the post-December history of Romania, they simply had to adorn and perfume the executive. No matter how dead a corpse is, it still has to smell good until the funeral is over.

From the logical angle, a government reshuffle three months before the cabinet has to pack up and go anyway is absolute nonsense. From the political point of view, taking into account that the government is Vacaroiu's, the move is a tricky one. It is eyewash, because the replacement of a few ministers will not alter the policy of the government. So much the less as the Vacaroiu cabinet's policy has never been conducted from Victoria Palace [government headquarters], but rather from Cotroceni [presidential headquarters] or the PDSR headquarters on Atena Street.

Due to the fact that in the coming electoral campaign the Iliescu regime will be unable to give the people bread, they chose to offer a circus show instead. Actually, in ancient Rome circus shows were nothing but blood baths staged to ease dissatisfaction among the plebeians. A few poor devils were thrown prey to hungry beasts whilst the crowd cried with delight. The reshuffle of Scrovistea was designed in Hollywood style. Blood is not blood, but rather red paint. The preelectoral sacrificing of ministers was staged in a perfect way. The sacrificed ones have nothing to lose because come autumn they would have lost their ministerial seats anyway. Besides, they can be sure that each of them will be offered something in exchange. Dan Mircea Popescu, the labor and social protection minister, for instance, is to be sent to our embassy in Bonn! Mironov [minister of sports and youth], too, will be given a cozy, but given the electoral period, strategically important post with the TVR [national radio and television company] administration board.

At the same time, the Iliescu regime might gain a little bit from the reshuffle. Its selection of the victims for this carnival was perfect. The people's dissatisfaction with Health Minister Iulian Mincu is immense. Especially the old and the poor wish to see him in the deepest possible hell. The union leaders, too, who are continuously being

summoned to the government for negotiations, just to be shown empty pockets and to be told that there is no money, will be surely content to see a different body sitting idle in the leader's armchair at the Labor and Social Protection Ministry, rather than the old minister, who, as I already said, is to be sent to Germany. Furthermore, they also count on lessening, to a certain extent, dissatisfaction among the farmers, who, under the leadership of Agriculture Minister Valeriu Tabara, have been subjected to a systematic impoverishment process. As everyone knows, the old, the union members, and the farmers, especially the poor ones, represent the huge reservoir of votes for the PDSR. This is why, in order to avoid the leaking of ballots to other parties, as happened during the local elections this past spring, the PDSR decided to reshuffle the cabinet and thus stop the leaks.

It still remains to be seen to what extent the Romanian electorate is able to perceive the political subtleties of the decision made at Scrovistea Palace. If they are unable to do so, they run the risk of realizing in the end—regardless of how many other ministers are yet to be sacrificed for face-lifting purposes—that the government has actually not changed. It is still Vacaroiu's. And his name, unfortunately, cannot be altered.

Romania: PNTCD Leader Believes in Electoral Victory

AU1408164796 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA
in Romanian 10 Aug 96 p 7

[Interview with Ion Diaconescu, president of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party, PNTCD, by Roxana Iordache; place and date not given: "The Democratic Convention Government Will Instill Positive Momentum in Romanian Life, So That the People Can See that Today Is Better Than Yesterday and Gain Trust in the Future"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

If Most-Favored-Nation [MFN] Status Was Granted to Us After a Delay of Almost Seven Years, It Was Due to the Policy of the Iliescu Regime

[Iordache] Mr. President, did you also wait for the Americans to come to the rescue?

[Diaconescu] I remember when I was doing hard labor in the Nistru mine, we would instinctively look up whenever a plane flew over the jail courtyard. The political officer told us in passing: "What are you looking for? Do you think the Americans are coming? Even at a snail's pace, they would have been here by now!" Well, when Mrs. Hillary Clinton came, I said

jokingly: "The Americans have come at last!" A foreign journalist must have overheard me because I was told that these words were printed in a French newspaper.

[Iordache] After many tribulations, which lasted almost seven years, the Americans have finally granted us the MFN clause on a permanent basis. What is your comment on President Iliescu's claim that Mr. Emil Constantinescu [president of the Democratic Convention of Romania, CDR] opposed the granting of the MFN status?

[Diaconescu] For years on end, in all our statements at home and abroad, we have constantly asked to be granted the clause and be accepted into Western structures because once accepted, the rulers would be obliged to observe democratic norms. We have always maintained that the Romanian people should not be penalized for the shortcomings of this government. Now, we hear Mr. Iliescu claiming that everything is owed to the current government, despite the opposition's efforts! As a matter of fact, the clause was obtained also thanks to the intervention of the opposition, whose word has a say in relations with the West. On the other hand, if the most favored nation status was granted to us after a delay of almost seven years, this is due to the policy of the Iliescu regime. It is embarrassing to boast now about receiving the clause, after all, the other countries in this European space have already obtained it. It is simply shameful. We should be glad that it has come even this late and let us rejoice in it, but my feeling is that we received it out of pity so as not to look totally ridiculous.

The Campaign of Threats and Slander Launched by the Power Raises a Question Mark About the Fairness of the Coming Elections

[Iordache] How do you characterize the current political situation on the eve of the upcoming electoral campaign?

[Diaconescu] It is worthwhile mentioning that after the local elections, the authorities have changed their electoral tactics. My impression before that was that the government has slightly changed its previous electoral methods and will conduct a more civilized campaign without resorting to such slogans as "The landlords are coming"; "The opposition wants to sell out the country"; or other stories ventilated in 1990. It seemed to me at the time that they were going to give up such practices. However, since the result of the June elections clearly showed that the Social Democracy Party of Romania (PDSR) registered huge losses and can no longer hope to win the fall elections by normal means, the rulers panicked. Instead of thinking what measures they can

take to improve the situation in the country, so as to gain some votes, or to come up with something positive, which can give them a hope in regaining the electorate, they only thought of means to intimidate the electorate. Scandalous pressures were exerted mainly in the villages, where the voters can be supervised more easily. All forestry workers were threatened that if they did not vote with the PDSR, they would be deprived of the right to wood. All town hall clerks, school and hospital directors, and public servants were submitted to pressures and open threats of losing their jobs. Then, the power reopened the campaign of slander, such as accusing the opposition of having objected to the granting of the MFN clause. The PDSR propaganda is currently blaming the opposition, particularly the CDR, for all current evils, while a country's rulers are normally being held responsible for their failures.

I confess that I was disappointed with the PDSR's reaction since I hoped that this government had abandoned such methods, which are totally outdated at this turn of the millennium. The campaign of threats and slander launched by the authorities raises a question mark about the fairness of the upcoming elections. I am beginning to fear possible thefts and large-scale fraud. It will be a tough campaign, but we will not fall into this trap since it is not in our nature to do so, anyhow. We will conduct our clear and positive campaign by telling the public what we want and can do, unlike this government, which has pushed the country into the abyss.

The Iliescu Regime Is Trying To Wash Its Hands of the Problem of Corruption

[Iordache] Would you like to comment on the precious recommendations handed down by President Iliescu to the PDSR at the Cotroceni [presidential palace] meeting?

[Diaconescu] The opposition's attitude toward the problem of corruption has alarmed President Iliescu, who realized that it might cost him quite a lot. There are currently two problems that concern the Romanian electorate: the economic crisis and corruption. Since the crisis is harder to remedy now, the authorities thought to try at least to wash their hands of the problem of corruption. After all, the people rightly realized that this corruption is based on collusion between political power and the world of business. Actually, in an economy which has been and still is government-owned to a large extent, all large transactions with important enterprises and capital in this country have been done by theft from the state with the connivance of the country's political leadership.

President Iliescu has known of the situation for a long time, but it is only now, in the electoral year, that he

is trying to separate the (parliamentary candidates of the) PDSR from the business world. In other words, he has adopted the old Maniu-Mihalache [pre-WWII PNTCD leaders] line, according to which the political leaders should not be involved in business, a line with our party has always observed and which seems to be also taken over by President Iliescu five minutes before twelve. My opinion is that he will have a very hard time of it since this symbiosis between the political and business worlds is so embedded in the PDSR, that he will probably not be able to separate them. Even if he were to do it, the majority might prefer the business world, which is more profitable: The political sphere was interesting to them only to the extent that it opened new avenues for business transactions. Therefore, I do not believe that Mr. Iliescu has adopted this attitude out of moral conviction—otherwise he would have done it a long time ago—but rather out of the fear of losing the fall elections. Maybe they do not even intend to actually implement this change within the PDSR, but only to make President Iliescu appear as "the man who struggles" for this goal.

Mr. Catarama [Viorel Catarama, businessman and National Liberal Party vice president] Promised Not To Run for Parliament

[Iordache] How do you explain the fact that exactly at the time of President Iliescu's request that the PDSR proceed to this separation between the political and business spheres, the National Liberal Party (PNL) announced its intention to push Mr. Catarama into the foreground?

[Diaconescu] In my opinion, that was a mistake. Of course, Mr. Catarama is an agreeable person who has great influence on and is making a great contribution to the PNL. However, we do not approve of his belonging to the political leadership. We will see how things are going to develop when we put together the electoral lists. As a matter of fact, Mr. Catarama promised me some time ago that he does not intend to run for either the parliament or the government. This remains to be seen. I will still try to convince our liberal partners to make this differentiation between the political and business spheres. This must be understood: Our party also has people who are still involved in business, but they do not have leading functions. As a matter of fact, the great politicians throughout the Western world are not businessmen. When a businessman like Berlusconi in Italy makes it to the political top, he gives up the management of his businesses, which are then being run by others.

The CDR Message Should Focus on Solutions to the Major Problems of Concern to the Electorate: the Economic Crisis and Corruption

[Iordache] What is the CDR's message?

[Diaconescu] We must act in two directions during the electoral campaign so as to present ourselves as a worthy alternative—given the serious situation in which our country finds itself. First, our message must contain an answer and solutions to the two major problems of concern to the electorate: the economic crisis and the corruption. Second, we must manage to present ourselves to the voters as we did in 1946, under the slogan: "Do Not Waste Your Votes!" Otherwise, there is the danger that the opposition will not win even if the PDSR loses. To avoid fragmentation—and we do not say this out of egotism—it is necessary that the votes be given to the main force, which is the CDR.

I Am Sure That If We Win Tomorrow, All of Those People Snatched Away by the PDSR Will Migrate to Us

[Iordache] You said that a party can only be trained to rule while it is in the opposition. Why?

[Diaconescu] Because the parties being formed while in power do not even exist as party structures and doctrinary groupings. As a matter of fact, you may recall that in December 1989 and January 1990 the National Salvation Front (FSN) tried to theoretically prove the uselessness of parties. The parties formed in power are circumstantial associations set up on opportunistic criteria, as the "emanated" ones were: They were not the emanated people of the revolution, but of the circumstance that they got together and got hold of power. The heir to this situation, the PDSR, is actually a client party set up by either the offer of material advantages and of political and administrative functions or by the threat of losing these positions and advantages. When you form a party in opposition, you proceed along a normal route: You launch an idea and program and call upon the people believing in that idea and program to join in. Therefore, the link between the followers is this common thinking and convictions. The PDSR is a purely "administrative" creation. These people are only bound by the purely material interest of keeping their positions. Forcing all public servants to join the PDSR—like in Ceausescu's [Communist former dictator Nicolae Ceausescu] time, when they were forced to join the Romanian Communist Party—does not amount to forming a political party. This is only a totalitarian-like manifestation of those who use the state apparatus to prolong their stay in power. On the other hand, the support enjoyed by an opposition party is also proof of the people's fairness since they do

not come to you out of opportunism or the search for positions, but rather out of conviction and the desire to struggle for an idea. Once in power, they will implement the program in which they believe. If someone joins a ruling party for the sole reason of not being dismissed from his position of manager, what is the value of his endorsement, which was given not out of conviction, but rather out of constraint? What trust can you put into that man? I am sure that if we were to come to power tomorrow, all those managers would immediately join our party, at the first opportunity offered to them, so as to keep their posts. This is no longer policy; it is a semblance of democracy.

The PDSR Is Practicing Political Revenge

[Iordache] If Ion Popovici from Turnu Magurele had run on a PDSR list and handed out presents to the children on 1 June, would he have still been arrested for electoral propaganda outside the legal time span?

[Diaconescu] I have heard that Ion Popovici, the president of the PNTCD organization in Turnu Magurele, has set himself at loggerheads, so to speak, with the local authorities, which were bearing him a grudge. Our man was held in jail for almost two months. In the end, he was "conditionally set free under judicial supervision." All this happened in a country that witnessed the barbarian actions of the miners without any measure being taken against them. Indeed, it happened in a country where billions of lei are being stolen every day—as you can read from the papers—without any judicial consequence and, if someone does get arrested, he is released immediately. I believe that Ion Popovici's arrest was a measure of force to show the opposition that no one can fool around with the authorities.

[Iordache] How do you view the dismissal of Lieutenant Colonel Gheorghe Bica from Craiova?

[Diaconescu] This is exactly what I said at the start of our conversation, namely that the authorities have now chosen a challenging course: The rulers do not call upon the people's convictions and their professional correctness, but rather upon their fears. The rulers want to prove that they have the power and have nothing to fear from anyone. Likewise, they want to show that those who do not obey them can suffer and are going to be punished. I heard from Arges county that an extraordinary campaign has been launched against two mayors to change sides and join the ruling party, after they were elected on the CDR lists. However, these cases—like many others throughout the country—are less visible and are only known locally. But the instances in Turnu Magurele and Craiova and quite strident. Lieutenant Colonel Bica is the only one who

has had the courage to arrest the sons of the prefect. Two days later he was dismissed from his post! This is extraordinary! These things are so flagrant that I cannot find the words to give vent to my indignation.

**We Are Not Cheating the People With a
Presidential Candidate Only To Bring Back the
Monarchy by Force Afterward**

[Iordache] The mayors who were hospitable to Queen Ana [wife of former King Mihai] were accused by the PDSR and President Iliescu of violating the Constitution. What do you say to that?

[Diaconescu] I did not find any restrictions in the Constitution on the issue of receiving foreign visitors. This is ridiculous! Is Mr. Iliescu not violating the Constitution when he extends protocol receptions with dinner to foreign citizens? Is he not violating the Constitution when he receives Paul Lambrino [rival of former King Mihai and contender to the Romanian throne]? Are the others who received King Mihai's wife also guilty? Maybe Patriarch Teoctist is guilty for receiving her, thus violating the Constitution?! This brings to my mind the ridicule of the situation when Maniu [Iuliu Maniu, prewar PNTCD leader executed by the communists after World War II] was accused of "high treason" for having received, in his capacity as party leader, the heads of the English, U.S., French, and other missions to Bucharest... Mr. Iliescu is the captive of the same mentality. His accusations against our mayors are reminiscent of his communist upbringing.

[Iordache] Even so, are you going to bring back the king if you win the elections?

[Diaconescu] No. We presented our position on this issue as far back as December 1989 and we are sticking to it. This whole matter of the form of state is a right that the people are entitled to. They are capable to pronounce themselves on it. We do not intend to cheat the people once we have come to power with a president of the republic, and tell them: "No, we are going to turn him into a king!" We are solving all problems in the open, clearly and democratically. It is the Romanian people's right to pronounce themselves on the issue of the republic or monarchy, and they will exercise this right under normal circumstances. This choice is not a party problem; it is a national one. Of course, King Mihai was deprived of his throne illegally and unjustly and was forced to abdicate. Therefore, we are not bound to heed that act dictated by Moscow at the time. However, since almost 50 years have passed since then, it is right and fair that the people should be consulted on this matter.

[Iordache] Will you and those from the CDR forbid the king's presence in the country?

[Diaconescu] Of course not. My God, how can we forbid him that? He is welcome to come whenever he likes. This is no problem whatsoever. He is a Romanian citizen and he can come and stay in the country, if he likes: it—no problem.

[Iordache] Why do you think that the rulers are so antagonistic to the monarchy and the king?

[Diaconescu] Because they obviously assume that the constitutional monarchy and the king will be reinstated. In such circumstances, a client party like the PDSR can no longer aspire to come to power for the simple reason that it would no longer have any clients since nobody would be constrained to give up his convictions and fear will cease to become a method of governing. A monarchical regime would probably give a guarantee of stability to this country; hence the PDSR's chance of still playing a political role would further diminish. That is why they fiercely oppose a possible return to the monarchy.

**Aside From Moral and Professional Criteria,
Political Criterion Will Also Apply to Our
Candidates**

[Iordache] What are the relations within the CDR?

[Diaconescu] All parties, particularly the alliances, become very excited at the time of elections. After all, there is an ongoing battle for candidatures. Our bad luck is that the local elections did not take place in February, as envisaged. Therefore, the echo of the local elections is still reverberating while we are already in another feverish state, caused by the upcoming elections. We have conducted various public opinion polls, on the basis of whose results we plan to establish a nationwide pattern for the component parties to appoint their candidates, in accordance with the number of seats allocated to them. The procedure must be finalized in August. When the electoral campaign opens, we must have the lists prepared. We should allow at least two months for the electoral campaign proper and not waste time with these internal struggles to establish the number of candidates.

[Iordache] What are the criteria for the candidates?

[Diaconescu] I know that everybody talks, and rightly so, about professional and moral criteria. However, one cannot do without the political criterion. The parties live through their cadres, active members, and their political activity. Hence, this body is the basis for selecting the candidates.

[Iordache] How many of your present parliamentarians will run for a new mandate?

[Diaconescu] I believe that 50 percent of them will do that.

When Romanians See That Today Is Worse Than Yesterday, They Lose All Hope

[Iordache] If the CDR comes to power, what changes will occur in daily life? Romanians seem to have lost hope in any change for the better.

[Diaconescu] The people's hope, particularly that of young people, has become wasted; my heart is aching when I see them leave the country, since I would like them not to give up; after all, I am sure that better times are yet to come. Seven years have passed, with the country led by the same regime, and things have gone from bad to worse. A change of regime would rekindle hope because it would give positive impetus to the economic, cultural, and social life. People would see that today is better than yesterday; hence they will gain trust in tomorrow, and so forth. But if Romanians see that today is worse than yesterday, they lose all hope.

[Iordache] Prime Minister Vacaroiu even said that nothing will change in the next two years because the situation cannot be improved.

[Diaconescu] These words come from a sinner's tongue! Of course, nothing will change if the PDSR stays in power because the current rulers cannot and are not capable of changing anything for the better. They have given abundant proof of that in the past four years. Therefore, those who want to cast their vote for another four year-term of the Iliescu regime should better heed the warning given by Prime Minister Vacaroiu himself instead of an electoral slogan: "All those who enter this booth to vote for the PDSR, leave all hope aside!"

We Hope Hungarians Will Renounce the Unacceptable Idea of Personal Autonomy

[Iordache] What is your attitude to the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR]?

[Diaconescu] Of course, we are democrats and intend to grant all rights to the minorities, but we do not want this to lead to the splitting and dismemberment of this country and the united national state. For the kind of rights invoked by the Hungarian minority, there is no need for territorial autonomy and self-government, which actually amount to a break and segregation from this united state. The administrative decentralization gives them all the rights they want. Why then proceed

with that segregation? This intention leads one to the idea—I am still under the influence of a book by a Hungarian historian, who brings up the same old story, so to speak—of territorial claims and so forth. But I sincerely hope that the moderate forces within the UDMR will realize this thing in the end and we will all reach harmonious coexistence in all spheres within this united country.

With the Opposition in Power, the Role of the Country's President Will Be Reduced, in Accordance With the Constitution

[Iordache] Do you take into consideration a possible coexistence of the Balladur-Mitterrand kind in France?

[Diaconescu] No, we are not thinking of that, since we expect an overall victory, both in the presidential and the parliamentary elections. But to answer your hypothesis, in which I do not believe: Of course, we will have to find a form of coexistence if Mr. Iliescu wins the presidential elections again and the CDR wins the parliamentary ones and forms the government. But then, Mr. Iliescu will no longer play the role he is playing today, when the prime minister is literally executing the precious recommendations coming down from Cotroceni and the parliamentary majority recognizes Mr. Iliescu as its supreme boss. Under a cabinet set up by the opposition, the president's role will be reduced quite a lot, in accordance with the Constitution.

Now I Can No Longer Say: Let Us See What Mr. Coposu [Cornel Coposu, deceased PNTCD president] Will Say to That

[Iordache] What did you feel when Mr. Coposu died?

[Diaconescu] Of course, I felt concerned about the responsibilities devolving upon me within the party because, after my release from prison, I had been meeting with Mr. Coposu every week in order to ensure the party's continuity. When he passed away, I was thinking with concern about the life of this party. The concern with the responsibilities incumbent upon me accompanied the great sorrow I felt on parting from a friend with whom I shared so much suffering and so many hopes for the future.

[Iordache] Do you still think of him?

[Diaconescu] Often. One would imagine that, with all the problems I have, I might have forgotten him. But this is not the case. When we hold a meeting, we recall what we decided together with Mr. Coposu. In other

words, those decisions are still constantly with us, in all the work we are doing here. As for taking over Mr. Coposu's tasks, I was familiar with them because for several years—particularly in the last ones—he was absent for long stretches of time due to his illness, and I had to fulfill these tasks. But in those days I could still postpone making a decision at a time of impasse. When

faced with insoluble problems, I used to say: "Let us see what Mr. Coposu will say about that. For the time being, we can do nothing more." Then, I had a way out. Now, I must make a decision—black or white—which is pretty difficult to do at times.

Federal**FRY: Lilic Hopes Spain Will Bring Belgrade Closer to EU, NATO***BR1608113296 Madrid ABC in Spanish 16 Aug 96 p 23*

[Report signed "S.N."]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade—Zoran Lilic, the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), has told Spain's first ambassador, Joaquin Perez Gomez, that he hopes Madrid will help bring Belgrade closer to the European institutions and NATO. On the occasion of the ambassador's presentation of his letters of credit, Lilic told Perez Gomez that Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is aware of Spain's traditional warmth toward the Yugoslav peoples. The Yugoslav leader described Spain as a country holding a lot of sway in the EU and NATO and said there was added value in the fact that NATO Secretary General Javier Solana had been Spain's foreign minister and had good knowledge of Spanish-Yugoslav relations.

Both Madrid and Belgrade are insisting that the fact that Perez Gomez will be the first ambassador to the FRY does not mean that links have been reopened; they were never closed. Spain had an ambassador in Belgrade, accredited to the FRY, until the UN Security Council imposed a financial blockade on the country for its role in the war in Bosnia in 1992. The EU decided that year to withdraw all of the ambassadors of its member states from Belgrade, where diplomatic missions nevertheless continued to operate under special attaches. The EU countries reappointed ambassadors when the Dayton agreements were signed.

FRY: Act Adopted on Membership in IMF, Other Organizations*LD1508170296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1609 GMT 15 Aug 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Aug. 15 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Government adopted Thursday an act on Yugoslavia's membership in the International Monetary Fund and other international financial organizations.

The government also reviewed a report on Yugoslavia's activities to date for the normalization of relations with international financial organizations, which it will submit to the federal parliament.

The adopted act proceeds from the decision taken by the IMF Board of Executive Directors on Dec. 14, 1992 and the fact that the normalization of relations with the IMF would imply the acknowledgement of Yugoslavia's membership since 1945.

The same would be the case with the other international financial organizations.

The act asserts Yugoslavia's consent with membership in the IMF and participation in the IMF department for special drawing rights and with membership in the World Bank, the International Financial Corporation, the International Development Association and the International Agency for Investment Guarantees.

The act has been adopted in keeping with the statute and other general acts of the IMF and other international financial organizations with a view to bringing the country's obligations and future rights in line with its real economic strength, a government statement said.

The Yugoslav government also defined Thursday the platforms for talks with the Slovak Republic, the Czech Republic and Hungary on the conclusion of agreements on economic and other forms of cooperation.

FRY: Report Details Two New Combat Weapons*AU1508155696 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 14 Aug 96 p 11*

[Article by J. Zaric: "Two New Weapons"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Our scientists in the military industry in "Zastava," have created two new combat weapons. They are the 122mm D30 automatic howitzer-mounted grenade launcher, and the 12.7mm long-range rifle that hits targets up to 1,800 meters. Both weapons were used practically for the first time at the firing range in Pasuljanske.

Work on the automatic grenade launcher, originally created for use by the infantry, took three years. The team of experts consisted of three designers and two specialists in the assembly stage. In the development department of the weapons factory, they say that the basic application of this new grenade launcher is in teaching and training, but it can also be used in combat, mounted on another weapon, or used independently. The entire project is now in its final stages of testing. When finished, it will become a regular weapon used by the infantry. It will also be introduced gradually into artillery units.

This new weapon has numerous advantages over similar weapons. It can use an instantaneous or a cumulative 30mm grenade. [sentence as published] It has a range of 1,730 meters, and directly fired it can hit a target at 800 meters. It has an instant-acting detonator that can be activated at a distance of up to eight meters, with 300 to 400 striking pieces hitting the target, covering an area of 35 meters. Naturally, it has its own sight device, and used as a stand-alone weapon, it can "mow" 30 degrees

in a single direction, with a possibility of elevation from minus five to plus 85 degrees.

There are two modes of firing: Minimum mode, with 80 to 100 grenades per minute, and maximum mode, with 350 to 400 grenades in 60 seconds. It is loaded with a cartridge belt from a magazine that holds 30 bullets. It works on the free bolt recoil principle, while the firing speed is controlled by a hydraulic brake. This weapon weighs 14 kg; and when it is free-standing, taken off the howitzer, it weighs as much as 45 kg. [weights as published]

At the Pasuljanske live fire range, the new 12.7mm long-range rifle received significant acclaim. It is intended for use in the infantry, and to a certain extent, in special units. It is used to destroy light-armored targets, and of course, personnel. The rifle holds five bullets, has an optic telescope, weighs 16 kg and is 1,600 mm in length. Its stopping power is very great—the projectile's initial velocity is 820 meters per second, and at 1800 meters dispersion is 1.8 square meters. Although this rifle is the repeating type, from the so-called Mauser system, recoil is significantly reduced by a gas break and buffer built into the rifle butt.

The analysis of hits effected by both of these new weapons have shown that they are extremely precise, and that therefore they will be quickly incorporated into units of the Yugoslav Army.

FRY: Communists Say Geneva Meeting Will Strengthen Peace

LD1508163896 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1613 GMT 15 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 15 Aug (TANJUG)—The League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia [SKPJ] believes the agreement in Geneva between representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the United States is yet another major step forward aimed at implementing the Dayton Agreement as a precondition for the establishment of lasting peace and the stabilization of relations in the former Yugoslavia, today's statement by this party says. [passage omitted]

FRY: SK-PJ President Announces Election Candidacy With JUL

AU1508144196 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1013 GMT 15 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 15 Aug—Ratko Krsmanovic, president of the Yugoslav Committee of the League of Communists—Movement for Yugoslavia [SK-PJ], told BETA today that the party would take

part in 3 November elections as part of the Yugoslav Left [JUL].

"Calling elections did not come as a surprise because they are regular elections," Krsmanovic said, and added, "it is good that care has been taken to allow enough time for conducting election campaigns."

He assessed that it was much better for parties "to focus on preparing for the elections than to waste time on conflicts with each other."

"There is no reason for any comment on the elections as they are an expected and regular process," Krsmanovic added.

FRY: Albanian Transport Ministry Delegation Arrives

LD1508130596 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1248 GMT 15 Aug 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Aug. 15 (TANJUG)—Secretary Zoran Krajacic with the Yugoslav Ministry for Transportation and Communication and other Yugoslav experts conferred here Thursday with a delegation of the Albanian Ministry for Industry, Transportation and Trade, headed by Secretary of State Arben Babameto.

A Yugoslav Government statement said the two delegations had considered in detail the imminent mutual interests in renewing and promoting cooperation in the areas of road, air, and railway traffic.

Both sides expressed interest in the Podgorica-Bozaj-Skadar railway line being opened as soon as possible, and said both countries were interested in the speedy establishment of conditions for commercial air traffic links between their respective airlines.

The Albanian side expressed particular interest in renewing and regulating cooperation in the area of road traffic, including passenger transportation.

In order to step up cooperation in that area, the two sides exchanged standard draft agreements and memorandums on inter-state relations in all three branches of the transportation industry. They also agreed that experts of the two countries should meet in mid-September to work out the bases and rules for future Yugoslav-Albanian cooperation in this area.

Serbia

Serbia: SPO Urges End of 'Oil War' Between Serbia, Montenegro

AU1508163396 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian
1406 GMT 15 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 15 Aug (BETA)—The Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) has issued a warning today that the "oil war" between Serbia and Montenegro represents a very dangerous continuation of the same campaign that the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and the Yugoslav United Left (JUL) began against Montenegro in March, when they accused the republic of preparing to secede.

In its statement issued today, the SPO stresses that, proceeding from the position of power, this time with the help of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia, which has impounded oil tankers from Montenegro, JUL and SPS "have reduced their political activities to sheer violence, with the open intention of causing dramatic clashes with catastrophic consequences."

The dangerous campaign against Montenegro must stop immediately, as Podgorica's efforts to "build a modern, democratic, and capitalist society do not represent separatism. They deserve full support and not impudent blows whose only outcome can be a national tragedy," the SPO statement points out.

Serbia: SPO Considers Geneva Summit 'Futile Talks'

AU1508164796 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian
1238 GMT 15 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 15 August (BETA)—The Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) has stated today that the Geneva summit represents "yet another in the series of futile talks on the implementation of the Dayton agreement," and that the "dangers that appeared over it are multiplying as the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina are moving closer."

The results of the elections in Mostar and what followed afterward confirm the correctness of the SPO's stand not to take part in such elections, a statement issued by the party points out. The statement also says that the minimum of the conditions for fair and democratic elections have not been created in the Serb Republic (RS) and the Croat-Muslim federation.

The statement points out that there is no freedom of movement in Bosnia-Herzegovina and that the media are under the control of the parties that have waged the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"The delays in the implementation of the Dayton agreement, which cannot be solved by any Geneva

meeting, confirm the SPO's view that those who have started the war cannot make nor preserve peace," the statement concludes.

Serbia: SPO Confident of 'Together' Victory on 3 Nov

AU1508142996 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian
0940 GMT 15 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 15 Aug—Ivan Kovacevic, spokesman for the Serbian Renewal Movement [SPO], said today that the Together coalition would triumph over the ruling socialists in Serbia and Montenegro in the coming federal elections scheduled for 3 November.

In a statement to BETA, Kovacevic said that all party decisions regarding the coming elections would be made at the 7 September meeting of the SPO Main Committee.

The SPO has drafted an agreement on the forming of the Together coalition based on principles agreed to earlier—that is, on 1993 election results—Kovacevic said. He added that the draft agreement would soon be submitted for review to all members of the Together coalition.

Serbia: SRS Chairman Comments on Geneva Meeting

AU1608120096 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian
1305 GMT 16 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 15 August (BETA)—Vojislav Seselj, chairman of the Serbian Radical Party [SRS], today assessed that yesterday's meeting of the presidents of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina in Geneva "was a continuation of the trade in the Serb national interests."

"Milosevic was invited to Geneva to further sell out Serb territories. He has already given up eastern Slavonia and Prevlaka, and now he is making new concessions in the Serb Republic by allowing the arrest of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic and even promising his assistance for IFOR in that," Seselj said at a news conference.

He assessed that the Croats "will not give up Herzeg-Bosnia so easily" and that it will continue to function even if happens to be formally abolished.

"Tudjman is much shrewder than Milosevic, so his reply to future remarks that Herzeg-Bosnia is still functioning will be that he did everything he could to abolish it, but that he did not succeed," the leader of SRS believes.

He said that he "is afraid of the mutual recognition of Croatia and the FRY" and pointed out that "one must not recognize Croatia until the Serb territories there are taken back or are exchanged—the Knin Krajina for eastern Slavonia, or western Slavonia for Dubrovnik and its hinterland."

Seselj appealed to all refugees to vote exclusively in the Serb Republic, because there is a possibility that around one third of votes abroad may be stolen, adding that "most probably, none of the parties in the Serb Republic will win an absolute majority" and stating that he expects a coalition between the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS] and the SRS.

Serbia: SRS Chairman Appeals to Serbs To Vote in Own Entity

LD1508163696 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian
1500 GMT 15 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 15 Aug (SRNA)—Vojislav Seselj, the chairman of the Serbian Radical Party [SRS], today appealed to all Serb refugees in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and abroad to vote exclusively in the Serb Republic in the upcoming elections in September.

"The Serbs should not vote anywhere else. All the ballots sent from here will be tampered with to the advantage of the Leftist parties in the Serb Republic," Seselj said at a news conference in Belgrade.

Commenting about the Geneva meeting, Seselj said that "bartering with the Serb national interest continues; after the surrender of the western and eastern parts of the Republic of Serb Krajina, it is Prevlaka's turn now."

"While [Serbian President Slobodan] Milosevic is giving everything away, [Croatian President Franjo] Tudjman is only seemingly agreeing to the dissolution of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, which in reality will continue to function even if it is formally dissolved," the SRS chairman said.

The SRS confirmed that it will take part in the recently announced elections for the Chamber of Deputies in the Federal Assembly.

Seselj said that radicals were taking part in the elections, despite the fact that the party had been banned from the state-controlled media for three years.

"The SRS is accepting the challenge and taking part in the elections. We started a fierce election campaign; we hold round tables in towns and villages in Serbia daily and hope for good results," Seselj said.

Serbia: SNS Comments on Geneva Meeting, Criticizes Milosevic

AU1608125296 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian
1339 GMT 15 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 15 August (BETA)—In a statement today, the Congregational People's Party [SNS] assesses that in Geneva the president of Serbia interpreted the policy and interests of the great powers as he usually does, and instead of the Serbian interest, he interceded for those of Croats and Muslims.

The president of Serbia obviously does not even know how to pronounce the words "Serb national interest," and that is why the barons of the so-called international community have the greatest confidence precisely in him, reads the statement.

The SNS assesses that the meeting in Geneva is more significant for things not known to the public than for what has been agreed behind closed doors and stated for the public afterwards.

"It is well known that secret diplomacy so far has always been pursued at the expense of the Serb national interests, so the SNS does not expect that anything will be different this time," the SNS statement concludes.

Serbia: DS Says Elections Will Strengthen Serbs' 'State Entity'

AU1508141596 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian
1035 GMT 15 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 15 Aug—The Democratic Party [DS] noted today that the holding of elections in Bosnia was extremely important because it will enable the Serb people to strengthen their state entity.

Commenting on yesterday's meeting between Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, and Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation President Alija Izetbegovic [title as received], the DS said that the international community needs to pressure Muslims and Croats in Bosnia because it is "obvious that the greatest problem in Bosnia is the relations between these two entities."

The currently ruling parties will probably win the elections, and the DS believes that it is necessary to create regular and equal election conditions, the DS statement reads.

Serbia: DS Claims Conditions for 3 Nov Elections 'Unfavorable'*AU1508170896 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian
1238 GMT 15 Aug 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 15 August (BETA)—The Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) warned today that the conditions for elections are by far more unfavorable than those that existed during the federal elections in 1992, and even those that existed in 1990, when the first multiparty elections were held in Yugoslavia.

The statement issued by the party expressed concern over the "silence and readiness of the opposition parties to accept the authorities' political dictate and take part in the unjust and unfair election race."

The federal elections scheduled for 3 November will be characterized by the absolute media and financial monopoly of the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia, the DSS statement points out.

Serbia: SDU Says SPS Has 'Immense Advantage' Over Opposition*AU1508145796 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian
0940 GMT 15 Aug 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 15 Aug—Zarko Korac, acting president of the Social Democratic Union [SDU] said that the ruling party has decided to call federal elections because it has assessed conditions as favorable primarily because there is not even a minimum of unity among the opposition parties regarding a joint platform for the elections.

Korac told BETA that by taking a more active role in implementing the Dayton agreement, the socialists believe that they will facilitate the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's reintegration into international financial and certain political institutions, "which would create a more favorable political climate and influence voters to again vote for the ruling party."

He said that the elections are going to be "even more unpredictable than before," because the "great apathy among the voters will not only target the opposition, but also the socialists."

"Nevertheless, thanks to monopoly over the media and control of funds, the ruling party has an immense advantage over the opposition," Korac concluded.

Kosovo**Kosovo: Returning Albanians to School 'Not an Easy Task'***AU1508111396 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT
in English 13 Aug 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The return of the huge army of Albanian pupils and students to the public school premises and the University of Prishtina [Pristina] campus in Kosova is not an easy task, Dr. Xhavit Ahmeti, President Rugova's educational advisor told today's BUJKA newspaper, adding that this is made difficult in view of the "devilish schemes of those who have forcefully driven us from our schools."

The BUJKA newspaper conveys the "high expectations" of the people, especially those involved in running Albanian-language education in Kosova, that we will see Albanians back in their schools from the beginning of the next school/academic year, that is September. "The return will happen at the end of the day," Dr. Ahmeti said, noting that "the feeling and expectation of the people emanates from the desire and determination of the people—pupils, students, teachers, and parents and all the Albanians of Kosova—that this happens as soon as possible."

President Rugova's aide said there is "nothing concrete" yet concerning the possible return of Albanians to the schools which are under strict Serbian regime control, adding that the international community has been trying to secure some kind of a start of efforts to solve certain concrete issues in Kosova, as a prerequisite for the talks process on the Kosova issue which should ensue.

Asked by the BUJKA newspaper to say whether any talks have been held and at what level, Dr. Xhavit Ahmeti said "possible consultations of our representatives with our friends, who are concerned about this (educational) issue and wish to assist towards its solution, can only serve as preparations for the start of genuine talks on this (Albanian education)."

Regardless of the fact whether we will be back in our school buildings or not in September, we will go ahead as planned with all preparations for the start of the new school year at all levels, Dr. Xhavit Ahmeti told BUJKA.

As many as 350,000 Albanians of Kosova have been involved in running the educational system in Kosova in the past five years under very harsh circumstances, since Serbian regime has cracked down on it.

Sixty-one out of 65 Albanian-language secondary schools have been operated in private homes, as well as the University of Prishtina in Albanian, since 1991. As many as 21 elementary school buildings have been closed to Albanians in the past few years, too.

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